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Abstract
Using the human capital model, supplemented by a preference framework focusing on
utility maximization, this paper examines the decision making process of the individual
when considering enrollment in higher education. The study applies a theory of herding
behavior to the investment decision, arguing that individuals use the decisions of others
who have gone before them as signals to reduce information costs and to aid in their own
decision making process. The paper further discusses the possibility of this behavior
leading to irrational investment decisions. Herding behavior will likely lead to an
increase in the supply of highly educated workers, perhaps to the extent that the supply
exceeds the demand. As a result, it is hypothesized that this phenomenon will yield a
decrease in returns on the investment in higher education. After a literature review, the
hypothesis is empirically tested by examining the earnings difference between individuals
who have obtained a bachelor’s degree and those who have earned higher degrees. The
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure is employed to gain insight on the payoff of
pursuing higher education in the face of increasing student enrollment. Although the
results do not provide evidence in support of the hypothesis, a discussion on how they
may still reflect irrational decisions is provided.
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I. Introduction
One would be hard-pressed to find a teacher in the United States who fails to
hammer into the brains of her students the value of a college education. Nonetheless,
there are still those who ask if too many people are making the choice to pursue higher
education. With rising tuition rates, some individuals are wondering about the true value
of a college degree, begging the question of whether people are being asked to spend a
great deal of money for a meager result (Wood, 2011). Compared to the past returns on
earning a higher degree, the present rewards may differ substantially. This paper
attempts to examine the decision making process of the individual as she considers her
investment decision in college as well as the results associated with such a decision.
Nobody wants to believe that America’s higher education system could be failing
to provide students with better lives. However, if it is the case that more and more
individuals are engaging in an investment in higher education, it is possible that the
supply of educated workers entering the labor force could exceed the demand.
Institutions are not necessarily duping individuals into making poor decisions by hustling
them and stockpiling their money. Rather, the nature of the problem exists within the
demand for education.
Individuals may be quick to engage in the decision to enroll without considering
the costs and benefits on a personal level. Instead, decision makers may be making the
choice to attend simply because everyone else is doing it. This does not imply that the
choice to attend college is a bad decision for everyone. On the contrary, a college degree
does offer many individuals a means for obtaining a better life. Nonetheless, the push for
higher education is not without consequences, either.
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If more and more individuals are choosing to enroll in higher education, it is
important to investigate what can be attributed as the cause of this as well as possible
repercussions. It is possible that individuals observe others following a certain path,
signaling to the decision maker that this is the ‘correct’ path since everybody is choosing
it. However, this signal may differ from the decision maker’s own private signals if she
were to do an analysis of the costs and benefits on her own instead of following the
decisions of those who made the choice before her. This has the potential to alter the
decision making process, implying that decisions being made currently would perhaps be
different if made in another environment where the individual is not influenced by others.
It follows that an irrational decision can be made in this context if the decision
results in returns that are less than initially anticipated and a situation in which the
decision maker could have been better off by choosing an alternative choice. This is
made even more likely if more and more students are choosing to attend college,
resulting in an oversupply of educated workers and a possible decrease in returns realized
by the investor.
To aid in a deeper discussion of this theory and phenomenon, Chapter II presents
a basic theoretical model to analyze how individuals typically make their decision to
enroll in college. The human capital model is used as the primary framework,
supplemented by a model of individual preferences and utility maximization. After these
basic theories are introduced as a foundation, the theory of herding behavior is introduced
to explain trends in the decision to pursue higher education. This model explores how
individuals often make choices based on others’ decisions. Herding is also further
analyzed in the context of distorted preferences, parental influence, and the subsidization
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of higher education. Other factors that pertain to the college investment decision, but are
left out of traditional models, are then explored. These include the importance of
completion, incomplete information that the decision maker faces, and credit and
financial constraints.
Chapter III presents a review of literature, providing a presentation of relevant
articles and research that have previously looked at how individuals make their decision
to attend college, as well as the returns on such an investment. Five articles are outlined,
focusing on empirical investigations of the college investment decision and the
connections they exhibit to the way individuals process information and make decisions.
The first article is useful in providing a basic method for empirically evaluating the
returns to the college investment decision by employing the human capital model.
Following, a look at recently implemented differential pricing policies between college
majors is used to glean an insight into the subsidization of education and how individuals
respond to changes in price.
Nonetheless, the decision to pursue higher education extends beyond simply a
pecuniary analysis. A third article examines what types of individuals enroll in graduate
and professional school, relating the decision to pursue higher education to individual
characteristics that likely reflect individual preferences. Extending beyond this, the
fourth article engages in a discussion of how the choice to attend school has changed over
time.
Since most of the literature focuses on the decision making process, the last article
is a study on overeducation with the labor market, providing, by extension, a method to
indirectly measure herding. If workers hold jobs that require less schooling than they
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actually possess, this may suggest an overinvestment in education, or an irrational
decision to invest.
Since the topic has received little attention in the area of economics, however, this
paper expands upon prior research by offering an empirical investigation to better
understand the effects of herding. Chapter IV focuses on the model specification used for
the empirical work. The results, supplemented by an analysis, are then provided in
Chapter V. Since herding is not confined to only the undergraduate level, the empirical
work focuses on the difference in earnings between individuals who have earned
bachelor’s degrees versus individuals who have earned higher degrees.
The model uses the decision to pursue higher education beyond the undergraduate
level to diminish the effects of herding. This is based on the idea that individuals who
make this enrollment decision are more informed about the investment and less
influenced by those around them. The paper hypothesizes, however, that herding still
affects the returns to a graduate degree, yielding a reward that is not as significant as one
may initially presume.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure is employed to decompose the
difference in earnings exhibited by the two groups. This is used to gain a better
understanding of the returns associated with earning a higher degree in the presence of an
increasing educated labor supply. Although the results do not support the hypothesis, a
discussion of how irrational decisions may still occur is provided. Finally, Chapter VI
summarizes relevant and important findings, critiques the model, and suggests further
extensions that would complement the research provided in this paper.
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II. A Theory of Herding Behavior and Irrational Decisions Pertaining to
an Investment in Higher Education
The choice to attend college has long been a decision faced by many individuals.
This chapter provides an overview of how individuals consider their decision to enroll in
higher education based on previous frameworks for analyzing the choice. Only after
understanding how decisions are made in a so-called ‘neutral’ or rational environment,
assuming no information costs, is it possible to contrast how choices are actually being
made. Although models are useful in simplifying a scenario for understanding, the
choice to pursue higher education is no doubt affected by factors that are not considered
in the classical frameworks used to analyze the decision.
The traditional framework used to evaluate the choice to invest in higher
education is the human capital model. This is presented as an overview of how
individuals consider the pecuniary returns on their investment, suggesting that a rational
individual should invest only if the net benefits exceed the cost of enrolling. This is
useful in that is allows for a basic and simplistic analysis of the decision.
Next, the chapter expands on this theory by considering non-pecuniary benefits an
individual may expect to receive from attending college. The theory considers a
framework that incorporates the preferences of the individual and aligns her decision with
utility maximization. Outlined are equilibrium conditions that will occur under utility
maximization.
The remainder of the chapter presents challenges to these typical models,
suggesting distortions in the decision making process and providing possible explanations
for an oversupply of educated workers as well the consequences that may ensue. A
simple model of herding behavior is presented and applied to the decision making
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process. This framework attempts to examine how irrational decisions are made in the
context of distorted signals. That is, there is a potential that individuals are led in the
wrong direction as impediments of information alter individual preferences and the
choices that would be made in different scenarios. The implications of this framework
are then analyzed in the context of the human capital model.	
  	
  
The chapter also examines the affect of parental influence on a student’s decision
to enroll. This provides support for the herding model by suggesting that preferences
may be distorted in the context of signals that are being received. The subsidization of
education by state governments also mirrors the effects of herding and distorts the signals
that students receive in regards to the price and cost of obtaining education.
The remainder of the chapter is devoted to understanding the importance of
completion when obtaining a degree as well as incomplete information students may
hold. In addition, the costs associated with obtaining information are examined. Finally,
credit and financial constraints faced by the decision maker are explored as well. Each of
these components relates back to individual decision process and how decisions may be
altered in the context of distorted signals and information.

2.1: The Human Capital Model
The first step in understanding how an individual would evaluate her choice to
attend college is in terms of the financial gains she would receive from doing so. The
basic framework and classic theory for analyzing the decision to pursue higher education
is the human capital model. This theory is based on the idea that attending college is
ultimately an investment in oneself (Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 1997). Capital can be
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thought of as wealth, whether said wealth may be quantified as actual money or as other
assets. Thus, human capital is therefore the ‘value’ or ‘worth’ of an individual in terms
of the benefits she produces in the labor market. If an individual makes the decision to
pursue higher education, it is assumed that she does so because she is enhancing her
ability to perform or produce labor at a higher quality and economic value. Thus, a
rational individual should view the decision in this most basic sense. In its simplest form,
the choice go to college or end formal education requires weighing the costs of attending
college against the returns (Blau et al., 1997).
The appeal of this method is in its simplicity, as it measures only pecuniary costs
and benefits of the investment. The decision necessitates comparing the expected
experience-earnings profile against each level of schooling. The expected experienceearnings profile is the annual earnings that correspond to each level of labor market
experience (Blau et al., 1997). A rational individual will choose to go to college only if
the returns are greater than the costs. Consider Figure 2.1.1. The graph depicts the
experience-earnings profiles for attending college versus entering the labor market
directly after high school.
The curve EF illustrates an individual’s earnings without a college degree. Point
E indicates the initial level of earnings, which correlates to zero years of experience. On
the contrary, if this individual decides to attend college she will observe a much lower
initial level of earnings. This is because she not only incurs expenses related to obtaining
a degree, but also foregoes income by deciding not to work during the years she devotes
to education. The expenses she incurs are direct costs that correlate to ‘negative
earnings.’ These costs include expenses such as tuition and books. If the student incurs
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OA dollars per year in expenses, the sum of direct costs is equivalent to the area OAB4, as
illustrated in the diagram.

$

R
G

Gross Benefits
Earnings (+)

R'

D
C'

F

C

E
Indirect Costs

0

Costs (-)

A

4

Experience (Years)

45

Direct Costs

B

	
  
Figure 2.1.1: The Human Capital Investment Decision for Comparing Costs and Benefits (Blau et al., 1997)

Further, the individual must consider costs beyond simply direct costs. Indirect
costs represent opportunity costs associated with the investment decision. This includes
the earnings that are foregone by the individual during schooling. Although the
individual at hand has decided not to work during college, even those that do can still
expect to experience large foregone earnings. When looking at the costs of the
investment overall, the individual must look at both direct and indirect costs. The area of
EABCD represents the total cost of a college education.
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Upon graduation, the student expects to receive earnings at the level of C’. Note
that this lies above point E, the earnings she could have expected without a degree. This
demonstrates the increase in productivity that the individual gains from her investment in
education. Over her lifetime, the experience-earning profile is represented by ABCG.
Therefore, although she sacrifices earnings in the beginning years of her career, by
investing in her human capital, she can anticipate higher lifetime earnings (Blau et al.,
1997).
The experience-earning profiles for both scenarios, entering the workforce or
obtaining more education, are increasing for the majority of the employee’s working
lifetime. This can be attributed to experience that the individual gains from on-the-job
training. However, it is also important to point out that the profile of the college graduate
rises at a faster rate. This has been attributed to empirical evidence that finds that those
who have earned college degrees boast more informal on-the-job training in addition to
formal training acquired in school (Blau et al., 1997).
The gross benefits of a college education are then illustrated by the difference
between the expected earnings for a college graduate compared to those of a high school
graduate, as shown in Figure 2.1.1. This is directly related to the length of an
individual’s work life. For example, if the individual decides to work 45 years after
starting college, as depicted, the gross benefits are equal to the area DRR’.
When analyzing the decision to attend college or not, it is necessary to compare
the gross benefits to the costs. The human capital model asserts that an individual will
decide to pursue higher education so long as the gross benefits outweigh the costs. That
is, the area DRR’ must be greater than the area EABCD. Time preference, however,
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declares that all else being equal, individuals prefer to have any given end sooner rather
than receive it later in the future. Thus, a sufficient return is required to induce
individuals to undertake such investments (Blau et al., 1997). Beyond this, however,
individuals also have different rates of return that entice them to partake in an investment.
Gross benefits must therefore also be large enough to provide the investor with an
adequate return based on their own preferences. This return should outweigh the yield of
other investments, such as profit received from investing in other assets or interest earned
through a savings account (Blau et al., 1997). Only after the benefits and returns are
analyzed in comparison to costs can the individual make her investment decision.

2.2: Preferences and Utility Maximization
	
  
Although the human capital model is valuable in its simplistic analysis, it does not
consider the individual’s preferences and the non-pecuniary benefits that she will receive
from her decision. These factors are no less important in the investment decision relative
to monetary gains. This does not discredit the human capital theory, however, but rather
adds another dimension to be analyzed.
Preference theory dictates that an individual will make her investment decision on
more than simply pecuniary measures. In this case, the individual will make her decision
based on the amount of utility the choice provides. That is, the decision maker is
concerned with the level of happiness, satisfaction, and enjoyment that the decision will
yield. In this context, her choice is the result of a process that optimizes utility.
Non-pecuniary benefits emerge both while in college and after graduation.
Students are likely to enjoy activities, such as sports for example, that they may not have
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had the opportunity to participate in otherwise. They are also likely to enjoy spending
time with peers, and engaging in intellectual exploration (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic,
2013). Beyond graduation, empirical evidence also suggests that, controlling for
different measures of family background and income, college graduates hold jobs that
provide a greater sense of accomplishment, independence, creativity, and social activity.
In addition, those with more education display higher reports of health (Oreopoulos &
Petronijevic, 2013). Although these benefits are difficult to quantify, they play a
significant role in the decision of the individual.
When making the choice to engage in additional schooling, the individual faces a
choice between consuming education (E) versus a composite good (Y). The composite
good can be defined of as an amalgam of other goods. By convention, it is thought of as
the amount of income the consumer has left over, which allows for all other opportunities
to be accounted for as the individual allocates her resources.
It follows that the decision maker’s utility is dependent upon education and the
composite good. The consumer attempts to maximize utility subject to a budget
constraint, the set of all bundles that exactly exhaust the consumer’s income at given
prices. This can be expressed as follows:
𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑌, 𝐸) subject to 𝐼 = 𝑃! 𝐸 + 𝑃! 𝑌
Note that I indicates the income that can be allocated to consumption, PE represents the
price of education, and PY represents the price of the composite good.
To find the values of E and Y that produce the highest value of utility, subject to
the constraint, the method of Lagrangian multipliers can be used. The more-is-better
assumption implies that the best affordable bundle will lie on the budget constraint. To
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determine this bundle, the constrained equation can be transformed into the following
unconstrained maximization problem where λ is the Lagrangian multiplier:
Maximize 𝐿 = 𝑈 𝐸, 𝑌 − 𝜆(𝑃! 𝐸 + 𝑃! 𝑌 − 𝐼)
The first-order conditions for maximizing L are obtained by taking the first partial
derivatives of L with respect to E, Y, and λ, and then setting these equal to zero. This is
illustrated below:
1.    

𝜕𝐿 𝜕𝑈
=
− 𝜆𝑃! = 0    
𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝐸

2.    

𝜕𝐿 𝜕𝑈
=
− 𝜆𝑃! = 0  
𝜕𝑌 𝜕𝑌

3.    

𝜕𝐿
= 𝐼 − 𝑃! 𝐸 − 𝑃! 𝑌 = 0
𝜕𝜆

Then, to find the values of E and Y that maximize the utility function, it is
necessary to solve the first order conditions for E, Y, and λ. Note that the solutions for E
and Y are the only quantities that are relevant for determining the maximization solution.
Setting λ equal to zero simply guarantees that the budget constraint is satisfied.
The equilibrium condition, displayed in Figure 2.2.1, specifies that utility is
maximized where the marginal rate of substitution at A is equal to the absolute value of
the slope of the budget constraint. This ensures that the best affordable bundle will occur
at the point of tangency between the budget constraint and indifference curve.
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Composite Good

Y*

A

I

E*
Education

Figure 2.2.1: Optimal Bundle A Based on Preferences and Utility Maximization

Following, it must be the case that:
𝑀𝑅𝑆 =

𝑃!
𝑃!

The right-hand side of this equilibrium condition represents the opportunity cost
of education in terms of the composite good. The left-hand side of the equation is the
marginal rate of substitution, which conveys the rate at which the consumer is willing to
exchange education for the composite good. In other words, it is the amount of
additional education the consumer would need to be given in order to compensate her
fully for the loss of one unit of the composite good, holding utility constant. This is the
absolute value of the slope of the indifference curve, or

!"
!"

   .
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As an example, suppose that the slope of the budget constraint is -2. The
tangency condition requires that 2 units of education would be needed to offset the
benefits lost due to giving up one unit of the composite good. In general, based on
preferences and utility maximization, the rational decision maker will consume education
!

up to the point where 𝑀𝑅𝑆 =    !! .
!

From this stipulation, as well as the first-order conditions, another equilibrium
condition can be derived. Using the first partial derivatives, it is possible to derive the
marginal utility of each good. The marginal utility of each good is the additional amount
of utility the individual gains from consuming one more unit of the good at hand.
Mathematically, the marginal utility of education and the composite good can be written
as follows:
𝑚𝑢! =

𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑈
    and    𝑚𝑢! =   
𝜕𝐸
𝜕𝑌

By taking the first partial derivatives and setting them equal to zero, we already know
that:
1.    

𝜕𝑈
− 𝜆𝑃! = 0    
𝜕𝐸

2.    

𝜕𝑈
− 𝜆𝑃! = 0
𝜕𝑌

Redistributing allows for rewriting these equations in the following forms:
1.    

𝜕𝑈
= 𝜆𝑃!
𝜕𝐸

2.    

𝜕𝑈
= 𝜆𝑃!
𝜕𝑌
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Then, dividing the first equation by the second equation, it follows that:
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝐸 𝜆𝑃! 𝑃!
=
=
𝜕𝑈/𝜕𝑌 𝜆𝑃! 𝑃!
Thus, the equilibrium condition is as follows:
𝑚𝑢! 𝑃!
=
= 𝑀𝑅𝑆
𝑚𝑢! 𝑃!
In other words, the ratio of the marginal utilities is equal to the marginal rate of
substitution of E and Y. The optimal bundle will only exist where these conditions are
satisfied.

2.3: The Theory of Herding Behavior
	
  
If the pervious theories indicate how a rational individual ‘should’ assess her
decision to go to college, how is it that irrational decisions stray from these models? In
such cases, signals are being distorted; causing a change in behavior that would not be
observed prior to the distortion. Subsequently, it is necessary to ask how individuals are
actually making decisions. A likely cause for a change in behavior is herding. Herding
behavior is used to explain the occurrence of a large number of people doing the same
thing at the same time. This has the potential to explain why increasing amounts of
individuals are making the decision to pursue higher education. In this sense, students
are influenced in their own decision making based on what others are doing.
Banerjee (1992) sets forth a simple model to explain herding behavior, which can
then be applied to the college investment decision. Herding behavior refers to following
the decisions of everyone else, even if private information provides a signal that suggests
following other alternatives. Individuals engage in this behavior because they assume the
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choices of decision makers who have gone before them may reflect information that they
do not hold (Banerjee, 1992). This, therefore, reduces the information and search costs
an individual faces. The decision maker will continue her search process and information
gathering only as long the marginal benefit is greater than the marginal cost. She will
stop the search process prior to acquiring all information because it would be too costly
to continue. Herding, thus, allows for a more efficient search for the individual.
However, although herding itself may be a rational behavior, the result of the behavior
may be an irrational decision.
For illustrative purposes, a straightforward example will be used. Suppose a
population of 100 people faces a choice between two options, A and B. It is known that
the prior probabilities are 51% for A being better and 49% for B being better. Further,
each individual has a private signal indicating which option is better. Although each
individual’s signal may be correct (or incorrect) all of the signals are of the same quality.
Now, out of these 100 people, suppose that 99 have received signals that favor B. If the
one person whose signal dictates that A is the better option chooses first, clearly she will
choose Option A (Banerjee, 1992).
The second-mover will then know that the first-mover’s signal favored Option A.
Since the second-mover has an opposing signal of equal quality, the two signals cancel
each other out. This leads the second decision maker to make a choice based on prior
probabilities and choose A regardless of her own signal indicating otherwise. Not
surprisingly, the third-player faces the same choice as the second-player. Likewise, she
will also choose A based on prior probabilities. Without further analysis, it is easy to see
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that the entire population will decide upon Option A, despite Option B originally being
the favored choice in the rational environment (Banerjee, 1992).
This example demonstrates how a negative externality is imposed on the entire
population. Suppose instead, however, that the second-player would have chosen to
follow her own signal. The third player would have then received information that the
second player held a signal that favored B. Thus, the third person would have chosen B
as well, and the rest of the population would have followed suit. However, since the
actual scenario results in everyone joining the ‘herd,’ a negative externality ensues, which
can be identified as the herd externality (Banerjee, 1992).

The Formal Model
Following this example, herding can be deduced into a more formal model, as
presented by Banerjee (1992) in his article, “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior.” First,
the article considers a population of size N, attempting to maximize a utility function
defined on the space of asset returns. It is assumed that the utility received is identical to
the monetary payout the individual acquires. Suppose, also, that there is a set of assets
indexed by numbers [0,1]. The ith asset can be denoted a(i). Then, the return to the ith
asset to the nth person is notated as 𝑧 𝑖 ∈ 𝑅. Let there be a unique i* such that z(i*) = z,
where z is positive. For all 𝑖 ≠ i*, z(i) = 0. Naturally, every individual would want to
choose i*. Although no individual knows which i is i*, some people do receive a signal
that suggests which asset is i*. However, there is a probability that the signal is false.
Others receive no signal at all (Banerjee, 1992).
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The process of choosing assets in this model is sequential. Each decision maker
is informed about the choices of each individual that has moved before herself. However,
she is ignorant to whether these people held signals or not. The game proceeds until
every person in the population has made a decision. The players who chose i* correctly
receive their payout while those who chose incorrectly receive nothing. If nobody
chooses i* it is not revealed and no one gains any rewards (Banerjee, 1992). Three
assumptions are made, which minimize the possibility of herding:

Assumption A. Whenever a decision maker has no signal and everyone else has
chosen i = 0, she always chooses i = 0 (Banerjee, 1992).
Assumption B. When decision makers are indifferent between following their
own signal and following someone else’s choice, they always follow their own
signal (Banerjee, 1992).
Assumption C. When a decision maker is indifferent between following more
than one of the previous decision makers, she chooses to follow the one who has
the highest value of i (Banerjee, 1992).

The first decision maker makes her choice based on whether or not she has a
signal. Clearly, if she does have a signal, she will choose that option. If the has no
signal, based on Assumption A, she chooses i = 0. The second player will follow the
choice of the first player so long as she, herself, has no signal. If she does have a signal,
she will follow her own, according to Assumption B (Banerjee, 1992).
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The third individual then faces a choice based on the history of the game so far. If
she observes that both the first and second player chose i = 0, she will also chose i = 0 so
long as she has no signal. Otherwise, she will follow her own signal. In all other
scenarios, if the third individual does not have a signal, she should choose to follow the
person who did not choose i = 0. However, if both of the two players have not chosen i =
0 and have also not chosen the same i, then she will make the same decision as the
individual with the highest i, as indicated by Assumption C (Banerjee, 1992).
It is also necessary to consider the possibility that player three does have a signal,
but the two players before her both agreed upon an i that was different than her signal
suggested, such that i was not i = 0. In this case she will follow the choice of those who
have decided before her. If the two players had disagreed, however, she would choose to
follow her own signal according to Assumption B (Banerjee, 1992).
If her signal matches the choice made by a predecessor (or both predecessors), she
should obviously follow her signal because the probability of that choice being i* has
increased. Obviously, the previous person would have chosen i = 0 if she had no signal.
So the fact that both individuals received the same signal suggests that the choice is more
likely to be i* (Banerjee, 1992).
Further, the same intuition indicates what should happen in any situation when
several options other than i = 0 have been chosen, but only one of them has been chosen
by two people. Consider the next decision maker in the process outlined so far and
assume she does not have a signal that matches any of the options that have already been
chosen. (If her signal did match someone else’s choice, she would clearly follow her
own signal.) If the choice chosen by the two decision makers was not the highest i, both
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of those individuals must have the same signal, suggesting that their choice has a higher
chance of being i*. Thus, the decision maker will choose this option. In the situation
where the choice is the highest i, this option is still chosen since it cannot be ruled out
that the decision makers did not have the same signal. Thus, in either case, the next
person chooses the option that has been chosen by two people. In summary, this implies
that once one option has been chosen by two people, the next person should always
choose that option as well unless her signal matches an option previously chosen by
another player. In such a case, she should follow her own signal (Banerjee, 1992).
A combination of this decision rule with Assumption C indicates that the next
decision maker will face one of the following three histories:

History I) One option (other than i = 0) has been chosen by more than one
person, and this is the one that has the highest i (Banerjee, 1992).
History II) One option (other than i = 0) has been chosen by more than one
person, and this is not the one with the highest i (Banerjee, 1992).
History III) Two options (other than i = 0) have been chosen by more than one
person, one of which is the one with the highest i (Banerjee, 1992).

If the first history occurs, the individual will choose the option with the highest i. In the
second and third histories, the option that is not the highest value of i is the ‘correct’
option because those who chose the option with the highest i most likely did so simply
due to Assumption C. Thus, the option that is not the highest i will be chosen and all of
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the subsequent decision makers will choose this option as well (Banerjee, 1992). A tree
diagram depicted in Figure 2.3.1 summarizes the outcomes.

Figure 2.3.1: The kth decision maker’s choice problem (k > 2) (Banerjee, 1992)

This model demonstrates how individuals herd considerably. Even with
assumptions that aim to minimize herding, it is still possible to witness decision makers
who ignore their own signals to follows the decisions made by those who have gone
before them. This is the case, even if the individual is not positive that the choice is
absolutely correct. Thus, although the first two individuals will follow their signals if
they have one, not even the third person is assured to follow her own signal. Even if an
individual has chosen the correct choice, herding at an incorrect choice still may exist
(Banerjee, 1992).
So long as each individual up to k has chosen a different option, if the k + 1
decision maker does not have a signal, she will choose the option with the highest value
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of i. As a result, according to the model, all other players will choose that option as well,
unless their signal matches the choice of an option already chosen. Thus, even if another
decision maker previously chose the correct choice, inefficient herding can ensue at an
incorrect option (Banerjee, 1992).
In addition, it is important to note that the equilibrium pattern of choices will be
very volatile if the process was repeated several times. The outcome depends on the
signals (or lack thereof) of the first few decision makers in the decision making process.
These signals may be random and also incorrect. Hence, the power lies in the hands of
these few decision makers rather than the quality of the information. From this, it is easy
to see how a herding externality occurs when the choices made by previous individuals
affect the information that subsequent decision makers have. As a result, this suggests
that each individual is less responsive to her own information. In a welfare sense,
although it is rational for an individual to join the herd, it reduces the probability that
future decision makers will choose the correct option. Thus, in an ex ante societal point
of view, the equilibrium pattern of choices may be inefficient for the population as a
whole (Banerjee, 1992).

2.4: Distortions in Preferences
	
  
The theory of herding behavior is effective in showing how the decision for
college can be distorted by the choices that peers and predecessors make. That is, many
students substitute the decisions of others for their own information. Although this is
rational in the sense that it reduces information costs for the individual, as each person
engages in this behavior, they may be effectively making a less efficient decision (a
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decision that is different than would be the case if they pursued their own information).
This may result in a herd externality, as those who observe the decisions of those before
them engage in this same behavior, choosing to do what everyone else is doing. Even
more, the process is exacerbated as it is transferred to the herd. In successive rounds, as
more and more people chose an inefficient or irrational choice, this option is reinforced.
Hence, the likelihood that people will follow along increases over time and the
population moves farther and farther away from efficient behavior (Baddeley, 2013).
This has the potential to explain why people are not learning from the mistakes of
others. Since everyone is doing the same thing, the information that individuals take
away and extract from the process is perceived to be of high quality, even though in
reality the information may not be as good as it is initially recognized to be. This
demonstrates an information cascade, characterized by individuals observing the actions
of others and then increasingly choosing that same option, independent of their own
private information and signals. As a result, the conclusions these individuals come to
are different than those that would be made autonomously. This suggests a ‘lower’
outcome than if everyone had just chosen independently of everyone else.
Appealing more to emotion, Wood (2011) discusses this behavior as, simply,
appealing to custom. It is possible that parents and students are persuaded that attending
college is the best decision merely because everyone else is doing it. Citing
embarrassment as a factor, many students finishing high school may feel a sense of
shame in entering the work force if all of their peers are pursuing a college degree.
Moreover, a sense of fear comes into play when individuals believe others will ridicule
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their choice if it deviates from the norm (Wood, 2011). Even if decision makers choose
an irrational choice, there is comfort in numbers.
On a similar note, a ‘sharing-the-blame’ effect arises, such that even when
irrational decisions are made, it is not perceived to be as bad when others make the same
mistake (Scharfstein & Stein, 1990). As a result, many people feel it is better to take the
risk of being conventionally wrong, than unconventionally right (Baddeley, 2013). This
is supported by prospect theory, which postulates that people are risk-seeking when it
comes to a loss, but risk-averse in the region of gains. In other words, the loss resulting
from disagreeing with the majority is weighted more heavily as negative than the gains
are weighted as positive from agreeing with the consensus (Baddeley, 2013). However, it
is also important to note that supporting consensus views does not necessarily imply
those choices are wrong. Problems may arise when following the herd reflects
motivations that differ from individual signals and private information, causing a
distortion in behavior.
Specifically, consider the choice of a high school senior. Assume her choice falls
between two options, continuing her education versus consumption of the composite
good. If the decision maker is accepting other people’s behavior as a substitute for
finding out information on her own, she is in effect choosing to ignore private signals she
may have come across otherwise. Suppose her indifference curve is, as a result, modified
from I to I’ as displayed in Figure 2.4.1.
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Figure 2.4.1: A Shift in Preferences Favoring Education as a Result of Herding

The graph shows a distortion in the individual’s preferences. The slope of the
new indifference curve, I’, is ‘steeper,’ suggesting that the individual is now willing to
give up more of the composite good than before, for a one unit increase in education.
This is shown in Figure 2.4.2, which presents a comparison of the two indifference
curves (illustrated in Figure 2.4.1), removing the budget constraint and all extraneous
details.
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Figure 2.4.2: A Comparison of Two Indifference Curves

The point of intersection between the two indifference curves is used simply for
ease of comparison. The graph shows that for an identical increase in education, the
individual is now willing to sacrifice more of the composite good than she was before
since the decrease in the composite good for I’ is greater than the decrease in the
composite good for I. In other words, the marginal rate of substitution is steeper for the
new indifference curve. Hence, this implies the individual has developed a stronger
preference for education and therefore places more value upon it.
Further reflecting this change in preferences, Figure 2.4.1 depicts a shift in the
optimal bundle from A to A’. Not surprisingly, the new bundle consists of an increase in
the quantity of education, accompanied by a decrease in consumption of the composite
good. In addition, as shown in Figure 4.2.3, with the individual’s new preferences, if she
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were to resort back to consumption at bundle A (the bundle with a lower quantity of
education), she would experience a lower level of utility as shown using the indifference

Composite Good

map. This, again, illustrates her new, stronger preference for education.

A

Lower Utility
Indifference Curve

A'

I

I'

Education

Figure 4.2.3: A Comparison of Utility Using an Indifference Map

Herding has the capability of distorting preferences by transforming the function
concerning the preference for education. Originally, it was assumed that the preference
for E was a function of only individual preferences, which will be denoted as IP. That is,
E = f (IP). However, an assessment of other individuals changes the nature of the signal
that is being received, suggesting that the decision maker is not following her individual
preferences only. For example, a student may have a strong preference to major in
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drama, but after evaluating the choices of others, she may come to the conclusion that
another decision is better because everyone else is doing it.
In many uncertain situations, individuals employ heuristics to guide their
interpretation of events. This creates cognitive bias, leading to herding and path
dependency, which explains a continued practice based on historical perspectives. Even
if a better alternative is available, an individual may choose to follow a previous path
because it is easier than following a new one and requires less information costs. While
resisting peer pressure may create awkwardness, conformity with others gives
psychological reassurance (Baddeley, 2013).
An example of this is the decision regarding going to grad school. Many students
faced with this decision may have the mentality that graduate school is now ‘required’ to
set an individual apart from her peers, especially with so many individuals now boasting
undergraduate degrees. Whether this be the case or not, the fact that many students are
choosing to pursue grad school signals to other students that they need to be doing the
same thing, whether the costs are warranted or not.
Since the bundle being chosen is no longer a reflection of only individual
preferences, the functional form of E must change to reflect the individual’s preferences
as well as person X’s choice. Therefore E = f (IP, X) since the bundle is no longer just an
image of the decision maker’s selection.
Further, if the decision made is based on person X, the choice also reflects a sense
of status. In other words, choosing the ‘right’ college is also a reflection of person X’s
choice. For example, this may mean choosing a more expensive or prestigious college.
This also applies to the choice of program. Based on the herd’s point of view, some
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majors are ‘wrong.’ This may be because they are not respected or because they do not
provide an adequate expected future income, for example. However, just because they do
not yield a high income does not mean that they are unfulfilling in regards to personal
preferences. Nonetheless, herding causes a transformation in such preferences. The
quality of an institution and/or program is therefore based not only upon individual
preferences, but also upon how the herd assesses it.

2.5: Implications of Herding Behavior on the Human Capital Model
Herding also has the ability to affect the human capital model. To understand this
in a more focused sense, it is necessary to first understand the rewards and consequences
of herding in a broader sense. First, decision makers can be divided into two types:
consensuals and contrarians.
Consensuals are those that follow the herd. For these consensuals, rewards are
first increasing and then decreasing in n: the number of people adopting the consensus
hypothesis. In other words, by being among the first to pursue an original idea, the value
of joining the group is initially high. As more and more people join, however, the
negative externality emerges, as returns from following the herd tend to decrease. That
is, the individuals are no longer able to signal that they are more talented than any of their
fellow herd members. They are in effect lost in the crowd, causing a decrease in returns
based on an increasing proportion of consensuals (Baddeley, 2013).
For contrarians, those who oppose popular trends, private rewards are declining in
n at a decreasing rate. In terms of education, a contrarian can be thought of as someone
who chooses an alternative to what everyone else is doing. This may be reflective of a

34

choice as simple as choosing a unique major. Since the contrarian refuses go along with
the herd while more people are joining it, those in the herd reject her behavior and the
decision is viewed as disconnected from the ‘correct’ choice (Baddeley, 2013).
As a result, the contrarian will not benefit from the payoff externalities that
initially exist for the consensuals. However, as the number of consensuals increases, the
decision will be viewed as more pedestrian, causing the returns to the consensual to
decrease. In time, the returns to the contrarian will eventually increase because she has a
unique set of skills that others do not have to offer. For this reason, the rewards for
contrarians fall at a decreasing rate, increasing eventually if the contrarian view evolves
into a more acceptable choice (Baddeley, 2013). A graph depicting the rewards to
consensuals and contrarians is depicted in Figure 2.5.1.

Reward

Consenuals

As more individuals join
the herd, the returns
decrease, possibly to the
extent that an alternative
choice yields identical
returns in the long run.

Contrarians

The Number of People Choosing the Consensus Choice (n)

Figure 2.5.1: The Rewards Associated with Consensuals and Contrarians as More Individuals Join the Herd
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An individual who chooses to follow her own signals and preferences in terms of
the decision to pursue higher education may experience backlash at first. However, it is
entirely possible that her choice may be a suitable choice in the long run. This is
especially true if the individual made the decision because it aligned with her preferences
and maximized her utility, implying she made an informed decision based on her
personal characteristics in an individual context. This is not to say that every contrarian
will fair well simply by choosing a path that is not the norm. The consensual and
contrarian model does, however, illustrate how herding, or a trend, is the most valuable to
those who join the herd early on in the phenomenon. For those who join later, the returns
become less and less.
As an extension, as more individuals choose to pursue higher education, the
returns may decrease if the norm becomes commonplace. As discussed previously in
terms of consensuals, if the supply of educated workers entering the labor force increases,
it is likely that the returns will fall. This reflects the increase in n. That is, if the supply
becomes higher due to herding behavior, net earnings will effectively decrease because
too many people will be joining the herd.
The implications of this are reflected in the fact that students make ex ante
decisions based on the human capital model. Therefore, based on herding, decision
makers may hold false expectations of the present value of earnings, exaggerating the
true outlook. As a result, the human capital model would be altered as shown in Figure
2.5.2, based on the consequences of herding.
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Figure 2.5.2: A Change in Gross Benefits Resulting from an Increase in Individuals Pursuing Higher Education

	
  

Clearly, as illustrated, the realized gross benefits are less than the expected gross

benefits. This has serious ramifications because a contrast from the original model
suggests that the decision would be evaluated entirely different. That is, when comparing
the costs to the benefits, it may be the case that the costs do not outweigh future expected
earnings if they are significantly lower than originally anticipated.

2.6: Parental Influence
	
  
Parents may also influence an individual’s college decision, thus distorting the
signal that they receive. Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012) comment that this even
includes genetic and cultural factors that are not necessarily deliberate decisions made by
the parent. Further, choices made by parents that influence their child’s health, exposure
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to education, and social experiences prior to high school have strong implications for the
child’s decision regarding higher education (Altonji, Blom, & Meghir, 2012).
Parents also have the capability to reinforce herding since they, as well, may feel
as if it is best to do what everyone else is doing. Not immune to social pressures
themselves, parents are sensitive to others looking down upon them or their children if
they do not steer their sons and daughters in the ‘right’ direction. It follows that parents
may also face a fear of ridicule that inflames the herding decision to attend college.
Assuming that parents only want what is best for their children, it is likely that they will
look to see how others have made decisions before them and follow suit. They may feel
as if it is not only important for their child to attend college, but to attend colleges with
certain characteristics that are viewed by society as prestigious (Wood, 2011).
Further, if parents are basing their beliefs on their own experiences, they may not
be up to date on the returns of such a decision. Even if the choice paid off for a parent in
the past, this does not necessarily mean that the return will be the same today. In this
sense, children may be following the decisions of not only their peers, but of decisions
that were made a full generation ahead of them.
Thus, although students themselves may feel pressure from peers to pursue higher
education, the expectation for them to attend college may be heightened by parental
influence. In this scenario, we see a shift in preferences similar to those seen through
herding. The individual will have a stronger preference for education, now a function of
individual preferences, X’s choice, and parental influence.
Likewise, the human capital model is expected to reflect this expanding push for
higher education, exhibiting decreasing returns based on an increasing supply of educated
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workers. As a result, the decision maker may have come to a different conclusion
regarding her investment decision if she had followed her own private signals. However,
as parental pressures and herding distort her signal, she may end up making an irrational
choice.

2.7: Subsidizing
	
  
For a majority of undergraduate institutions, states provide large subsidies to
higher education, which allows them to provide schooling below actual costs and with
little price differentiation between students and programs. It follows that herding, in
regards to making the decision to invest in higher education, may be heightened as a
result of subsidization if individuals perceive the cost of education to be less than it
actually is. In addition, without tuition differentials, students currently participate in
implicit cross-subsidization across majors which results in students paying prices that do
not actually align with true instructional costs. This has the ability to distort an
individual’s perception of the true cost of the degree. This is unique from an economic
standpoint as profit-maximizing institutions typically charge prices based on the marginal
cost and the consumer’s willingness to pay (Stange, 2013).
As an example, a science major is likely paying a lot less than an art major when
comparing the price to the actual instructional costs. The implications of this are that it
may deter some individuals who are very interested in art from pursuing this major,
especially if they do not feel as if the costs align with future rewards. If art majors are
now deciding to become science majors, the supply of science majors will increase,
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exacerbating the herd. Therefore, a possible result is a distortion in the composition of
degree types, yielding a world with too many science majors and too few art majors.
Although subsidization is an attempt to enable individuals to obtain higher
lifetime earnings and boost the economy, pushing for everyone to go to college may not
necessarily result in the returns anticipated for every individual. The more students
enrolled in college, the less a college degree serves as a distinguishing signal. In other
words, a degree signals to employers that the individual is qualified and that she
possesses skills that others may not have. However, if many others also hold the same
degree, she may find it difficult to differentiate herself, essentially signaling to employers
that she has the same credentials as everyone else. That is, the individual is less likely to
boast skills that other candidates lack. As a result, the signal will most likely stand for
less and less if a bachelor’s degree is becoming more commonplace.
Herding, however, is not incorporated into the ex ante evaluation of returns. Even
if a college graduate makes $1 million dollars more over her lifetime today than she
would without the degree, this only signals the current expected earnings. This is not
representative of what actual future earnings may be in the presence of a growing and
more competitive labor force supply. This may be indicative of why more individuals are
also choosing to pursue graduate school. They may feel as if this is a necessary step to
take in order to differentiate and distinguish themselves to employers from other
candidates.
Subsidies incentivize individuals by offering a reward, essentially encouraging a
specific behavior in the opposite way a tax would (Stange, 2013). In other words, this
will lower the opportunity cost of choosing education, because PE decreases. It is

40

anticipated that this will yield an increase in the supply of educated laborers, perhaps to
the extent that it exceeds demand. As a result, degree-holders may realize lower returns
or be forced to work outside of the field in which they obtained their degree. Therefore,
it is possible that subsidies are enabling students to purchase degrees that they may not
use.
This does not necessarily imply that students do not receive non-pecuniary
benefits from their time devoted to learning. However, it nonetheless affects individual
preferences and the human capital model, mirroring the effects of herding. An individual
will hold stronger preferences for education, causing a transformation in the shape of her
indifference curve. Also, as more students pursue higher education, it is possible that a
decrease in expected earnings may ensue, causing the individual to realize smaller gross
benefits than originally anticipated. As a result, this distortion in behavior may lead to an
inefficient outcome. This is especially the case if the individual would not have come to
the same decision without the distortion in her signal that reflects a price that is not
actually aligned with true instructional costs or the ability to repay such costs after
graduation.

2.8: Importance of Completion
	
  
Completing school, not just attending school, is a major determinant of future
earnings. Labor economists have specified that ‘diploma’ or ‘sheepskin’ effects exist,
which imply that beyond just going to school for a few years, the actual possession of a
college degree boosts one’s earnings significantly. Thus, there are significant benefits to
completion over just attending college for some time. Specifically, data indicates that
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those who complete some schooling but do not finish their degree only earn slightly more
than workers who have obtained no further education beyond high school (Oreopoulos &
Petronijevic, 2013).
Individuals also possess abilities, which are a source of uncertainty to the
individual (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). It may be the case that individuals are
being influenced to pursue education, but lack the capability of completing the required
work necessary for obtaining a degree. This may lead to a higher dropout rate or having
to repeat classes, delaying the time until graduation and therefore, also, the rewards of the
investment. This increases direct and indirect costs, such that the return of the investment
is less than originally forecasted. Even more, those who are unable to complete their
education will have incurred significant costs while realizing a very minimal return.
This is not to suggest that some students should not drop out. Oreopoulos and
Petronijevic (2013) contend that school should be thought of as an ‘experience good.’
After individuals discover more about their true potential to succeed in college, some
students should choose to let bygones be bygones if they lack an ability to do well.
However, the authors also cite that most students discount the possibility they will not
perform well from the very beginning (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). Supporting the
idea of an increasing preference for education, possibly by those lacking the ability to
succeed, Oreopoulos and Petronijevic (2013) cite evidence that verifies students are
taking longer to complete college and that completion rates have stagnated.
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2.9: Incomplete Information
	
  
Many students are ill-informed about the costs and benefits associated with
college (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). As with any investment, risk is involved.
Individuals are using only an idea of expected earnings to evaluate the investment
decision. However, expected income and returns are not guaranteed. This relates to
information costs and the search process an individual must go through. If the costs of
obtaining information are too high, especially considering the complexity of financial aid,
students may use other details to make the search less taxing. For this reason, high
information costs and incomplete information will reinforce herding behavior. It is often
the case that students place more emphasis on extraneous details that are not necessarily
pertinent to the decision being made (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). When the
plethora of choices becomes overwhelming, it may be easier to focus on factors that have
no relation to a long-term investment.
This illustrates the consequences of relying on unreliable signals. The more
informed a student is about her investment decision, the more likely she will be able to
receive a return she is satisfied with. However, it must be noted that attaining a higher
degree is not an irrational decision for all individuals. The decision becomes irrational
when an individual could have chosen an alternative that would have made her better off.
This emphasizes how the choice must be made in a personal context. If an individual is
relying on unreliable signals rather than gathering information on her own, the decision
may not align with the individual’s best interests.
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2.10: Credit and Financial Constraints
	
  
A fault of the human capital theory is that it inaccurately assumes that individuals
encounter no credit constraints. However, research suggests that students do face
borrowing and credit constraints, as those coming from wealthier families are 16
percentage points more likely to go to college than those from low-income families
(Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013).
An option for those who cannot borrow perfectly against their future income is to
work during school. This can decrease the direct costs of education if earnings are
applied to tuition costs. However, this also has the potential to delay time until
graduation, thus delaying the rewards of the investment. Further, working while in
school reduces the amount of time that students may devote to studying. This has the
potential to decrease the quality of the skills the investor is attempting to acquire for her
future performance in the labor force (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). A graph of this
scenario is presented in Figure 2.10.1.
Although the student saved a cost equal to the area of A’AHH’ through working,
by delaying time until graduation by two years, she acquired additional costs equal to
area CB’H’ID’D. The area labeled Gross Benefits’ indicates the new expected earnings
for the individual based on this scenario. Clearly, the costs and benefits must be
examined differently than originally expected.
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Figure 2.10.1: Possible Effects of Working While in School on the Human Capital Model

Although individuals may take out loans to pay for the investment, this also has
the ability to distort present decisions, particularly if debt aspects in the future are not
carefully considered. In the short run, loans make education look less expensive. This
may possibly lead to an inefficient decision if individuals are not able to pay off loans in
the long run, especially if the returns they receive on their investment are not as high as
initially anticipated. An individual must therefore be able to understand the long-term
consequences of holding debt when making the college investment decision.

2.11: Conclusion
The human capital theory and the preference theory framework regarding utility
maximization provide a foundation for understanding how individuals typically consider
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the decision to investment in higher education. However, as it is possible to observe
more and more individuals making the decision to attend college, this may result in an
oversupply of educated workers, potentially affecting the returns realized by the
investors.
The theory of herding behavior explains why large bodies of people are doing the
same thing at the same time, illustrating how students are influenced in their own
decision making based on what others are doing. In an attempt to reduce information
costs, individuals are likely to substitute the decisions of others for their own information.
However, as more and more individuals choose an inefficient or irrational choice, the
process is exacerbated and the population is likely to move further away from efficient
behavior. This also has the potential to explain why individuals are not learning from
their mistakes.
This theory has implications for the human capital model as consensuals are
expected to receive decreasing returns from choosing the consensual decision. As more
students earn degrees, the signal they possess that distinguishes them as a valuable and
skilled worker effectively decreases. Because individuals make ex ante decisions,
however, individuals may hold false expectations of the value of earnings they will
actually receive.
Similarly, the signals that decision makers receive are also distorted by parents,
who may pressure their child to go to college, deeming it as the ‘right’ choice. This
phenomenon appeals to the idea of custom and the notion that individuals are deciding
upon the choices they are making simply because it is what is expected and because it is
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believed to ultimately be the correct option. This, too, may result in an oversupply of
educated workers, effectually lowering the returns of the investment.
Subsidizing of education by state governments also has the ability to alter the
decisions made by individuals. By providing education below actual costs, this
incentivizes decision makers to engage in higher education. Although this certainly has
the ability to increase social welfare, an unintended consequence may be an increase in
the supply of educated workers, perhaps to the extent that it exceeds demand. Again, the
result may be that of decreasing rewards pertaining the investment. This may also result
in degree-holders having to work in fields outside of their degree, clearly distorting the ex
ante predictions regarding the human capital model and utility maximization. Without
this bias in price the choice of the individual may indeed be different.
The importance of completion also suggests serious consequences for herding.
As diploma or sheepskin effects have been proven to exist, it is crucial for a student to
finish her degree if she expects to receive a substantial return on her investment. If
herding is occurring, it may be the case that individuals who do not possess the ability to
succeed in college are being influenced to acquire a degree. Thus, these students will
have incurred significant costs while realizing a very minimal return, suggesting that an
irrational decision was made.
Incomplete information is also expected to affect the choice of the decision
maker. As many students are ill-informed about the costs and benefits associated with
college, as well as the risk involved, students may opt to use other details to make the
search process less burdensome. This reinforces the herding model since following the
choices made by predecessors significantly reduces the costs of obtaining information. A
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more informed student is more likely to make a better decision and choose the option that
is the most satisfying to her, personally.
Lastly, the impact of credit and financial constraints has repercussions on the
decision making process as well. A fault of the human capital theory is that it assumes
individuals encounter no credit constraints. This is not the case. Students may choose to
work during college to makeup for such constraints. However this may reduce the
amount of time available to devote to studying and may entail a delay in the time it takes
the student to graduate, thus, also delaying the rewards of the investment. This requires a
different analysis of the costs and benefits that are originally made. In addition, the
human capital theory does not consider the individual’s assessment of debt and her ability
to pay it off in the future. It is possible that credit constraints may distort present
decisions if debt aspects in the future are not considered.
The concepts outlined all relate to the decision making process of an individual
concerning the choice to invest in college. Many illuminate how irrational decisions may
be made if individuals are influenced by distorted signals. If herding behavior entices
individuals to ignore private signals in favor of other unreliable signals, this may lead to
an increase in the enrollment in higher education. As a result, the supply of educated
workers may be too high, in the sense that it could exceed demand. This has serious
implications for the decision maker if the rewards of the investment do not align with
original expectations of future returns.
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III. Literature Review
In order to extrapolate on the theory further, as well as empirically test the
hypothesis that too many individuals are making the choice for higher education, it is first
useful to examine previous literature. The articles reviewed provide relevant studies,
models, and research pertaining to the college investment decision involving possible
irrational decisions. Five articles are discussed, revealing important connections to the
choices made by individuals and possible distortions in the way information is being
processed.
The first article is included to provide and understand a basic method for
empirically evaluating the returns to the college investment. It is useful in that it employs
a basic human capital model, thus relating directly to the theory. The article is also
helpful in that it considers earnings conditional on either graduating or not graduating,
relating to the importance of completion. Further, the study incorporates individual
characteristics to investigate the returns more holistically.
After understanding a basic way to measure the returns to education, it is possible
to consider how decisions are distorted and altered. The article, “Differential Pricing in
Undergraduate Education: Effects on Degree Production by Field” explores how
employing varying tuition prices for undergraduates based on major has affected the
decisions that are made (Stange, 2013). This tackles the cross-subsidization of education,
which is predicted to alter decisions based on distortions in prices. Differential pricing,
however, is able to align tuition more closely with instructional costs and the ability to
repay costs post-graduation (Stange, 2013). As a result, this has the power to
significantly alter the proportion of students entering different majors, as well as the
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decision to attend college at all, suggesting that the possibility that irrational decisions are
currently being made.
The theory so far has dealt primarily with earning an undergraduate degree, but
another possible avenue to explore is the decision to attend graduate school. Analyzing
this choice has its benefits in that the decision is more removed from factors that intensify
herding behaviors. It is assumed that at this stage in life, decision makers are more
informed about their choice and are less affected by parental influence and the decisions
of peers. Bedard and Herman (2006) attempt to determine who goes to
graduate/professional school based on economic fluctuations, undergraduate field, and
ability. This model is appropriate in that it considers individual specific characteristics
that are likely to reflect preferences and aspects that affect the choice made. Although
economic fluctuations are not of the greatest concern to this paper, other variables may be
substituted, such as financial and credit constraints for example. Overall, the article
provides an analysis of how individuals are affected by external information beyond the
rational environment.
Although it is important to consider how individuals make certain decisions at
certain points in time, it is also necessary to consider how college decisions have changed
over time. Long (2003) insists that this is particularly important as the college market has
shifted from a local market to a more regionally and nationally integrated competitive
market. In addition, the tuition price has nearly doubled in real terms over the 30 years
that is investigated (Long, 2003). The author maintains that the most important aspects to
consider are thus cost, quality, and distance. These are analyzed according to how their
role in the decision process has evolved over time. The author also includes individual

50

characteristics in the decision making process, making the assessment even more
valuable. Overall, the article is beneficial in that it essentially examines how individuals
process information, especially in the face of a shifting market. Clearly, the number of
choices available to students has expanded, creating more information for the decision
maker to process. It is probable that the individual may resort to herding or rely on
specific signals to aid her in the decision making process.
Although the previous articles consider the returns to education as well as the
choice process, it is also helpful to think about ways in which herding may be measured.
Sicherman (1991) does not address the decision making process but does provide
information regarding ‘overeducation’ in the labor market. This refers to workers
holding jobs that require less schooling than they actually have. Sicherman aims to
explain why this discrepancy between actual and required level of schooling occurs as
well as the resulting differences in returns to schooling. He considers alternative forms
of human capital as well as occupational mobility. However, his theory and results also
have the capability to reveal an oversupply of workers if individuals are taking lowerlevel jobs because they have no other choice. This would support a theory of herding
behavior, especially if individuals are realizing lower returns than anticipated.

3.1: Estimating the Ex Ante Expected Returns to College
With an increasing amount of individuals making the choice for college
education, it is important to understand empirically the returns that the investment
provides. Hussey and Swinton (2011) provide an empirical model for estimating the ex
ante returns to college, asserting that it has never been more important to be able to
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interpret the expected return. This is due to the notion that a college degree is
increasingly considered as a necessary credential for employment in many occupations
(Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
The article is also important in the way that it considers how individuals measure
and decipher the returns to education, ultimately considering how the decision to invest is
made. Although the authors do not explicitly refer to the human capital theory, they are
in essence measuring returns according to this model. They attempt to understand how
students should estimate their expected returns based on an ex ante investment decision.
Ex ante, meaning before the event, implies that individuals make a decision based on
what they anticipate the return being in the future. In this sense, the decision is a
prospective method of calculating costs and benefits (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
The authors note that the attempts of previous literature to estimate the returns to
a college education often make the comparison between the earnings of individuals who
obtain a bachelor’s degree and the earnings of those who do not. However, as an
improvement to this most basic model, Hussey and Swinton (2011) comment that a
growing body of literature has attempted to isolate the effects of graduating from an
institution of higher quality, based upon some proxy variable. Nonetheless, they contend
that the uncertainty involved in graduating has not been explored. Therefore, since the
likelihood of graduating is expected to vary depending on the type of institution one
attends, the authors suspect the ex ante expected return on the investment to differ from
the estimated returns conditional on graduating (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
As indicated in Chapter II of this paper, completing school, not just attending
school, is a major determinant of future earnings since ‘diploma’ or ‘sheepskin’ effects
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do exist (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013). If, as suggested by the herding model, an
increasing number of individuals are making the decision to invest in higher education, it
is possible that those who are being influenced to attend are those who lack the ability to
actually complete college, potentially incurring a significant cost without realizing the
expected return. This may be especially problematic in the face of lengthier completion
times and stagnating graduation rates (Oreopoulos & Petronijevic, 2013).
Hussey and Swinton’s (2011) article is unique in that it takes into consideration
the importance of completion. They authors consider a highly varied college experience,
as well as the variance in the net returns to college. The authors predict earnings,
probabilities of graduation, and ex ante expected returns separately by quartiles of a
standardized test score. Two broad classes of college selectivity are then used to measure
the quality of education.
The dataset by the authors is the National Education Longitudinal Study of
1988/2000 Postsecondary Education Transcript Study Data Collection (NELS 1988/2000
and PETS). This study used a nationally representative sample of eighth-graders at the
time of the first survey. A sample of these respondents was then surveyed through four
follow-ups in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 2000 (Hussey & Swinton, 2011). The researchers
obtained the data through an IES restricted-use data license. Individual annual earnings
in 1999, as reported in the latest follow-up survey in 2000, are used to measure returns,
the dependent variable. A sample of 4,970 high school graduates with non-missing
earnings and covariates were used, some of whom obtained a bachelor’s degree and some
of whom attended college but did not graduate (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
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The researchers then divided those who attended college into two groups, based
on the college in which they were enrolled. Each was categorized as attending either a
selective or nonselective institution based upon the selectivity measure provided by
NELS. Using this information, the authors employed a linear regression model to
estimate earnings. The dependent variable was identified as the log of annual salary in
1999 (an average of seven years from high school graduation and an average of two years
from college graduation). This is denoted by Yi.
Independent or control variables (Xi) included by Hussey and Swinton (2011) are
NELS test score and indicator variables for race and sex. Then, each of the models is run
separately for five groups (j). These groups can be defined as high school only, some
selective college, some nonselective college, nonselective bachelor’s, and selective
bachelor’s. Hussey and Swinton (2011) employed this method to measure varying
returns to individual characteristics across schooling levels. With the coefficient
estimates (𝛽! ), the authors predict the earnings for the entire sample for all five
categories (𝑌!" ), regardless of the education path actually chosen (𝑌!" = 𝛽! 𝑋!" ).
Since some students enroll in college but fail to graduate, the likelihood of
graduating (Pr(gk)) is calculated based on the type of institution that is attended. Note
that (k) represents the type of school. The authors calculate this because they assert that
the probability of graduating may differ across school type (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
Hussey and Swinton (2011) state that higher quality (or more selective) schools tend to
have higher graduation rates, possibly due to selection effects as well as the school
environment. Estimates of the coefficients (𝛾! ) were then obtained from separate probit
models based on individuals who attended colleges of each selectivity group,
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conditioning on the same variables as in the earnings equations as well as additional
explanatory variables (Zi). These additional explanatory variables include factors such as
whether a parent has earned a bachelor’s degree or higher and whether parental income in
1991 was greater than $50,000 (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
Hussey and Swinton (2011) represent the probability of each individual
graduating from both selective and nonselective institutions by the equation: Pr 𝑔!" =
  𝑓(𝑋! , 𝑍! , 𝛾! ). Finally, to estimate the ex ante expected returns to schooling based on
attending college of a particular type, the authors multiplied the predicted salary,
conditional on graduating from that college type, by the probability of graduating. This
was then added to the product of the predicted salary from some college and the
probability of not graduating from that type of college. Thus, the equation is as follows:
Pr 𝑔!"   ×   𝑌!" 𝑔! = 1 + 1 − Pr 𝑔!"   ×  (𝑌!! |𝑔! = 0) (Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
To understand the results based on the data used, the authors first consider the
estimated returns from schooling for the entire sample when the probability of graduating
is not taken into account. This imitates the traditional model often presented in previous
literature (Hussey & Swinton, 2011). Following, the authors compare this to the
estimates of expected returns that are derived from incorporating graduation rates. The
results suggest positive expected returns to college for all groups, and strong returns to
school selectivity (Hussey & Swinton, 2011). However, after incorporating individual’s
estimated probabilities of graduating, the overall returns to college estimates decreased
(Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
The authors’ next step involved comparing the expected earnings from college for
individuals who obtained only a high school diploma to the earnings actually obtained by
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college graduates. After the researchers ran a traditional earnings regression, the results
indicate large returns to a bachelor’s degree and smaller returns to only some college
(Hussey & Swinton, 2011).
Looking at the ex ante expected returns including individual-specific graduation
rates, Hussey and Swinton (2011) state that the results do not support college attendance
for a large portion of students in regards to attending a nonselective institution.
Interestingly, students in the top and bottom quartiles of NELS test scores who attended
nonselective institutions did not experience a significant difference in expected salaries
compared to their actual, current earnings. However, significant increases in earnings are
expected for all NELS quartiles from attending a selective college (Hussey & Swinton,
2011).
The authors do not suggest any hypotheses for why the expected salary and actual
income for those in the top and bottom NELS test quartiles do not exhibit a significant
difference (in regards to attending a nonselective institution). However, they do mention
in their introduction and literature review the theory of “under-matching,” referencing
previous studies. This applies to talented students, perhaps those in the top quartile, who
opt to attend lower quality institutions with high dropout rates instead of attending higher
quality schools with low dropout rates (Hussey & Swinton, 2011). It may be that
proficient students suffer from an environment that does not foster growth and learning.
Those in the bottom quartile perhaps lack the ability to succeed, possibly exacerbated by
a below-average learning environment. Thus, the findings may imply that the quality of
the school is important for completion and future returns.
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Nonetheless, the results are important in that they reinforce the concept of
heterogeneity in returns to the investment decision. The article stresses that it is
necessary to look at ex ante expected returns (i.e. the human capital model) based on
more than just the average return to earning a bachelor’s degree. There are strong
implications concerning varying returns based on individual ability and personal
characteristics, school selectivity, and probability of completion (Hussey & Swinton,
2011).
It is important to recognize that based on these attributes, some students may be
making irrational decisions to attend college if the ex ante returns are predicted to be
much higher than what is actually realized. The authors themselves assert that their
results do not support college attendance for a large portion of students, specifically for
those in the top and bottom NELS test quartiles looking to enroll in a nonselective
institution (Hussey & Swinton, 2011). These individuals may incur high costs without a
significant return to justify their decision. In this sense, it is possible that students with
incomplete information, or those that face high costs in regards to obtaining information,
could make an irrational decision if they are following the decisions of others.
Hussey and Swinton’s (2011) model is useful in that it provides a more complete
and holistic view of the human capital model. However, it still fails to recognize how
individuals consider non-pecuniary rewards in terms of their decision to pursue higher
education. The authors assume that monetary returns to education are the only thing that
should be considered when evaluating the investment decision. Further, the model does
not distinguish between various majors and the returns associated with each.
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Nonetheless, the article provides a good benchmark in measuring pecuniary
returns to education and is advantageous in its simplicity. The framework is useful in
that it exhibits an appropriate model for evaluating differing monetary returns to
education by tailoring it to be more specific to the individual at hand.

3.2: Differential Pricing in Undergraduate Education: Effects on Degree Production
by Field
In order to assess the demand for education and the individual’s decision process
in regards to this investment, it is important to understand how the supply and price of
education play a role. Clearly, as pointed out by the human capital model, the costs of
attending school are a main component of the investment decision as they are measured
against the returns. Stange (2013) points out, however, that higher education is highly
unusual in the way that pricing is implemented.
Non-differentiated pricing in education creates cross-subsidization across major
fields by charging students similar prices regardless of instructional costs or ability to pay
post-graduation, thus affecting how students decide on what major to choose (Stange,
2013). The author examines the concept of differential pricing mainly as a means for
policy-makers to alter the mix of undergraduate degrees in order to achieve the greatest
return for society as a whole. He believes this method can be used as well as to
encourage students to enter high-need fields (Stange, 2013). However, the article is just
as important in understanding how the subsidization of education has the ability to alter
the choice of the decision maker, ultimately nudging the individual towards a possible
irrational decision.
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Stange (2013) declares that in an attempt to provide individuals with access to
high-quality postsecondary education, states have historically provided large subsidies to
public institutions, allowing them to charge students a price well below actual costs and
with little price variation between in-state undergraduate students within institutions.
However, this is atypical for profit-maximizing firms since they are predicted to charge
prices based on marginal cost and willingness to pay (Stange, 2013). In agreement with
the human capital theory, the author notes that individuals weigh the long-term expected
benefits of studying a particular program against the short-term costs of doing so. If the
supply of available spaces in a major is perfectly inelastic, the author declares that
individuals are free to choose the major for which the expected benefit is the greatest
(Stange, 2013).
After implementing price differentiation, the author predicts that high prices
should discourage students from entering impacted fields, holding all else constant.
Although he contends that the most salient benefit is the financial return, he also
acknowledges, however, that benefits include non-financial aspects associated with each
major as well. These include things such as the pleasure of doing something that the
individual enjoys, as well as the consumption value during college (Stange, 2013). The
analysis is thus valuable in that it considers pecuniary benefits but does not ignore a
preference framework that incorporates non-pecuniary benefits as well.
The author asserts that the effect of implementing differential pricing must be
tested empirically as the result of charging varying prices on enrollment is ambiguous.
For example, an increase in price has the possibility of deterring students if they feel as if
the program has become too expensive. However, if programs receive additional revenue
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from differential pricing, it is possible that they will use this additional revenue to
improve quality, possibly leading to an increase in demand. For example, the department
may be able to invest this increase in revenue on better professors or better resources.
This has the ability to attract more students, despite the increase in price (Stange, 2013).
Another scenario to examine is an initial equilibrium of over-demand. That is,
more students wish to pursue a major than there are spots available. In this case, higher
prices may permit oversubscribed departments to expand the supply of education (that is,
the number of available spots for students) and increase the number of admitted students
(Stange, 2013). Since a wide variety of results could ensue from implementing
differential pricing, it is important to investigate the implications of putting into effect
such a policy. The results are important, as almost no research on how major-specific
prices affect students’ major choice has been conducted (Stange, 2013). This allows for
an examination of how the choice of an individual may change after a more accurate
price is signaled to the decision maker.
To empirically test the outcome, the author uses data on the mix of degrees
awarded by 142 large public universities from 1990 to 2010, focusing on engineering,
business, and nursing. These fields were chosen because they are the most common
targets for differential pricing and account for a sizable share of all undergraduate
students (Stange, 2013). Of the 142 universities, 50 of these adopted differential pricing
within this time period (Stange, 2013).
Although the article notes that the most common data source for tuition
information is the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS), Stange
(2013) comments that it only publishes differentials by instate status. Thus, the author
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obtained data on tuition differentials by program compiled by Glen Nelson (2008) for his
doctoral dissertation “Differential tuition by undergraduate major: Its use, amount, and
impact on public research universities.” The data contains incremental tuition or fees
charged to different majors above base tuition (in percentage terms) for the 2007-2008
academic year at 161 public research universities. This was then narrowed to the 142
institutions of which the precise timing of differential adoption was available, 50 of
which had implemented differentials for engineering, business, and nursing majors as of
the 2007/2008 academic year (Stange, 2013). Since the timing of field-specific
differentials was not obtained, the author assumes that differentials for all majors at an
individual school were adopted at the same time.
The primary outcome examined (the dependent variable) is the share of
undergraduate degrees awarded by field, which is assessed using the IPEDS Degrees and
Certificates Conferred (Completions) module. Stange (2013) then calculates the fraction
of bachelor’s degrees awarded in engineering, business, and nursing for each institution
in each year from 1990 to 2008 overall and by sex and race.
Institutions are grouped into three selectivity categories as well (most or highly
competitive, very competitive, and competitive or less competitive) to aid in
understanding what types of institutions have implemented differential pricing. This is
also done to control for observed (and unobserved) differences between colleges that may
correlate with both major choice and the adoption of differential pricing (Stange, 2013).
For example, the author indicates that institutions that adopt differential pricing tend to be
slightly larger, better resourced, and more likely to be in the “very-competitive” category.
Further, institutions with differential pricing tend to have more engineering and business
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majors than colleges without differentials. Thus, since there are apparent differences
between institutions with and without differentials, it is necessary to control for such
differences (Stange, 2013). The author also takes into account how differential pricing
affects the compositions of financial aid of students in impacted fields as well as
individual-level data from the 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 waves of the National
Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS).
The main strategy employed by the author is a difference-in-difference model.
Based upon staggered adoption by institutions, the empirical examination compares
changes in major shares between those universities that have recently adopted differential
tuition pricing to changes at universities that did not alter their tuition policy during the
time period. This is useful in that it isolates how the choices of individuals have altered
based on changes in prices, thus eliminating other trends that may affect decisions during
the time period. Basically, the model assumes that outcomes for treatment and control
schools trend similarly in the absence of treatment (Stange, 2013). Thus, the differencein-difference strategy is helpful in segregating the effect of pricing to analyze how
irrational decisions may be occurring in the face of previous cross-subsidization.
Stange (2013) declares that the coefficient of interest is the change in the share of
degrees granted for the three majors following the adoption of differential pricing. To
estimate this coefficient, the author first documents the major share changes following
each school’s adoption of differential tuition by calculating the change in the fraction in
each major following the policy change. The results indicate that the majority of schools
experienced a decrease in the fraction of students majoring in engineering and business
but, in contrast, an increase in the fraction of students majoring in nursing when
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differential pricing was introduced. This trend persists even after a number of different
identification strategies and robustness checks (Stange, 2013).
To better understand how time plays a role in the decision-process, the author
specifies a difference-in-difference model that permits separate effects for the immediate
(0, 1, 2 years after the policy was enacted) and medium-run (3 and 4 years after) time
periods. These event-study estimates suggest that any treatment effects may take 3 to 4
years to emerge as the most notable changes occurred three years after differential pricing
was enacted (Stange, 2013). Specifically, the author’s results show that differential
pricing for engineering is associated with a statistically significant 1.1 percentage point
decrease in the share of degrees awarded in engineering after three years (on a base of
14.7 percent). For business, a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the share of degrees
awarded was recorded within three years (on a base on 19.5 percent). Dissimilarly,
nursing actually displayed a 0.8 percentage point increase in the share of degrees awarded
(on a base on 4.4 percent), though imprecise and not significantly different from zero
(Stange, 2013).
Stange (2013) concludes that these figures are associated with fairly large
elasticities. For engineering and business, the implied elasticities are positive 0.51 and
0.30, respectively. The elasticity for nursing is positive and almost unity (elasticity =
1.0). Stange (2013) also reports that it does not appear that additional institutional grant
aid, from an increase in prices, offsets the increased tuition for impacted majors. Women
and minorities, however, have larger proportionate effects than male and white students
(Stange, 2013).
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This study is important in that it illustrates how implementing differentials may
impact the field that students pursue. Although the author focuses only on specific
majors, it is possible that such price changes may affect not only what field students
choose to pursue, but also what college to attend, or even whether to attend college at all.
The fact that students appear to respond to differential pricing suggests that students may
be currently making irrational decisions based off of ‘imprecise’ information. If the
signal sent to the student about pricing is distorted based on subsidization, the
individual’s decision is expected to be different than a decision made in a ‘rational’ or
neutral environment. If the price were aligned more closely with true instructional costs
or the ability to repay costs after graduation, the choice would likely be altered. Thus, if
a decrease in students pursuing degrees with higher prices does actually result from the
implemented policy, this may suggest that herding is indeed occurring in the higher
education investment decision.

3.3: Who goes to graduate/professional school? The importance of economic
fluctuations, undergraduate field, and ability
Although extensive research has been conducted on the decision process of
choosing whether or not to attend college, the focus has primarily been on high school
students pursuing an undergraduate degree. However, the decision to attend graduate
school is likely to reveal important contributing factors to the decision process as well.
The choice to pursue graduate school may be the most useful decision to examine as it is
more removed from factors that spur on herding behavior. In other words, by reducing
other ‘noise’ in the process, it may be possible to identify how irrational decisions are
made even by individuals who are more informed or less affected by others in their
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decision. It is probable that at this point in the decision maker’s life, she is likely to hold
more information and be less influenced by her parents or peers.
Bedard and Herman (2006) attempt to analyze this decision to attend graduate
school beyond what has been done in the past. They note that a substantial amount of
literature already exists that examines the impact of the business cycle on the decision of
individuals to complete high school and enroll in college. The majority reports that
enrollment increases when the unemployment rate rises, thus, displaying a
countercyclical relationship in general (Bedard & Herman, 2006). Although the authors
consider several descriptive editorial/review articles on the subject related to graduate
school, they are not aware of any previous econometric study that analyzes the effect of
the business cycle on advanced degree enrollment (Bedard & Herman, 2006). As they
point out, the choice to attend graduate school is an important decision to consider as the
cost, in terms of lost wages, is much higher than for high school or undergraduate
education. Thus, it is has the potential to be more seriously affected by economic
fluctuations (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
Although the article looks at enrollment as a whole in regards to economic
fluctuations, it is valuable in that it may reveal or mimic ways in which prices or financial
constraints affect the choice being made. As a substantial fraction of the population now
holds advanced degrees, if that number continues to rise, it is critical to understand how
the decision to pursue such a degree may be distorted under different conditions,
especially in respect to large costs associated with the investment.
Bedard and Herman’s (2006) study is also pertinent because it employs the human
capital investment model when examining a Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) holder’s
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decision to enroll in an advanced degree program. The authors assume that individuals
evaluate the expected pecuniary and non-pecuniary returns associated with various
educational paths and choose the option that maximizes their expected lifetime utility,
which is in accordance with the preference framework as well. Specifically, they focus
on an individual’s enrollment decision just after earning an undergraduate degree. In
concurrence with the human capital model, they reiterate that the decision to enroll in a
graduate/professional program depends on the expected advanced degree wage premium
relative to the net educational cost incurred (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
To create a more stylized and individual-specific model, the authors incorporate
differences in ability and educational background since wage opportunities and/or
graduate stipend offers will also differ as a result of this (Bedard & Herman, 2006). The
authors’ research is valuable in this sense because it considers factors beyond just
earnings, allowing for a better understanding of how the individual choice process is
affected by characteristics beyond simply the average expected return.
Since the response of enrollment to business cycle fluctuations is unclear, it must
be addressed empirically (Bedard & Herman, 2006). In order to estimate the impact of
the business cycle on the decision of individuals with different ability levels to enter an
advanced degree program, Bedard and Herman (2006) maintain that detailed information
is required that relates to family background, individual attributes, educational history,
ability, and the economic conditions over many years. To acquire this information the
authors use as their main data source the 1993-2001 National Survey of Recent College
Graduates (NSRCG) provided by the Scientists and Engineers Statistical Data System
(SESTAT). This contains detailed information on recently graduated science and
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engineering bachelor and master’s students from 1990 to 2000 (Bedard & Herman,
2006).
The NSRCG is a series of five nationally representative samples of recent science
and engineering B.Sc. and master’s graduates who earned a degree from a United States
institution in the two academic years prior to the survey reference date (Bedard &
Herman, 2006). The surveys primarily look at science and engineering degrees,
classified into five categories: computer science and mathematics, life sciences, physical
sciences, social sciences, and engineering (Bedard & Herman, 2006). To account for and
measure business cycle fluctuations, the authors use state-level unemployment rates from
the Local Area Unemployment Statistics program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS). Specifically, the annual state unemployment rate for the civilian non-institutional
population age 20-24 is used.
Although the NSRCG covers a large portion of students, a fault of the data is that
it fails to provide information on non-science and engineering students (business
administration, arts, and humanities). However, an advantage of using these surveys is
that academic history information can be linked to individual and family attributes as
well as local unemployment rates over time, thus allowing for an examination of graduate
school enrollment decisions over the business cycle (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
The dependent variable being measured is enrollment in graduate school. To
measure ability, the authors use B.Sc. GPA as a measure of observable ability. In order
to control for socioeconomic status and family background, the authors use data on age,
number of months since B.Sc. graduation, ethnicity, state location of high school and
B.Sc., an indicator for being married with an employed spouse, the number of children
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residing in the household, and mother’s educational attainment, all of which are retrieved
from the NSRCG (Bedard & Herman, 2006). Since the NSRCG contains only
observable wage data for employed individuals during the reference period, data on
expected wages, potential wage opportunities, or other wage offers are obviously not
available for the entire sample, which prompted the use of state-level unemployment
rates as an indicator of economic opportunities faced by recent graduates (Bedard &
Herman, 2006).
The authors employ a probit model as their empirical approach since the
dependent variable can only take two values (enrolled or not enrolled), therefore
exhibiting a binary response (Bedard & Herman, 2006). The independent variable,
denoted Git, equals 1 if individual i is enrolled in a particular type of graduate education
program (denoted by t) in the survey period directly after obtaining a B.Sc. It follows
that Git = 0 otherwise. The choice problem is defined as below:
𝐺!"∗ = 𝛽UER !" + GPA!" 𝛽! + MAJ!" 𝛽! + 𝑇! ∅ + 𝑆! 𝜃 + 𝑋!" 𝛾 +    𝜀!"
(Git equals 1 if 𝐺!"∗ > 0 and Git = 0 if 𝐺!"∗    ≤ 0)
Note that G* is the propensity to enter an advanced degree program directly after
college, UER is the state-level unemployment rate, GPA is a set of three GPA indicator
variables, MAJ is a set of dummy variables indicating the individual’s undergraduate
major, T is a vector of B.Sc. graduation year indicators, S is a set of state of B.Sc.
graduation indicators, X represents observable characteristics, and 𝜀 is the error term
(Bedard & Herman, 2006).
Distinguishing the effect of the business cycle on graduate enrollment is based on
two assumptions set forth by the authors. First, Bedard and Herman (2006) assume that
within state unemployment rate fluctuations are independent of the unobservable
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characteristics that contribute to determining enrollment status, such as unobserved
ability. Secondly, it is assumed that fluctuations appropriately capture the entry-level
labor market economic conditions at B.Sc. graduation. Further, the regression equation is
in reduced form because unemployment rate is meant to represent the combined response
to potential wage and graduate stipend offers. That is, it reflects the net effect of the
difference between the potential forgone wage and the potential graduate stipend offer
(Bedard & Herman, 2006).
Applying the data to the choice problem defined by the equation, the authors
obtain an unbiased estimate of the impact of the business cycle on graduate school
enrollment. The results indicate that, not surprisingly, students with higher GPAs are
more likely to pursue advanced degree programs (Bedard & Herman, 2006). In regards
to major, physical science majors are the most likely to enroll in Ph.D. programs. The
authors observe that male Ph.D. enrollment is counter-cyclical, male master’s degree
enrollment is procyclical, female professional school enrollment is counter-cyclical and
all other enrollment appears to be acyclical (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
Understanding why male master’s degree enrollment is procyclical is undoubtedly
a major point of interest. The authors propose that the reason for this may be due to a
substitution of master’s degrees for longer Ph.D. programs during economic expansions.
In addition, there may be a reduction in the number of employers paying for part-time
master’s programs if economic conditions are poor (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
In addition, the authors do admit that there is a substantial difference in B.Sc.
majors across gender. There is an extreme concentration of women in social science,
which makes it difficult to detect business cycle driven graduate school enrollment in
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models due to the small cell sizes for many of the undergraduate major state-year cells
(Bedard & Herman, 2006). Nonetheless, the authors conclude that male and female
graduate school enrollment decisions are differently impacted by the business cycle, with
men being much more responsive to labor market fluctuations (Bedard & Herman, 2006).
Although the article focuses on how decisions are affected by business cycle
fluctuations, it is still relevant to the research question at hand because it looks at how
individual decisions are affected by certain signals and information. It may be possible to
use another variable, other than the unemployment rate, to empirically examine the
decision making process of individuals and how the choices they make may result from
distorted signals. In addition, the article was useful in incorporating individual-specific
characteristics that may also affect the decisions being made and potentially distinguish
how some individuals behave irrationally. Overall, the article demonstrated how
individual decisions are affected by external information beyond a rational or neutral
environment.

3.4: How have college decisions changed over time? An application of the conditional
logistic choice model
Long (2003) notes that over the last 30 years, the market for higher education has
changed dramatically, requiring an analysis of how the individual’s choice for college has
changed. The author claims that as American higher education has grown from a local
market to a market that is now integrated regionally and nationally, this has made the
college enrollment decision increasingly complex. For this reason, the author insists that
colleges have had to differentiate themselves, resulting in higher variation between
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colleges and increasing options available to students, including tuition prices and quality
(Long, 2003).
Although available subsidies offered to students has grown as well, Long (2003)
claims that the list tuition price of colleges has nearly doubled in real terms over the last
three decades. Nonetheless, the benefits associated with college have increased as well,
leading people to respond by enrolling in greater numbers (Long, 2003). Although the
author is concerned with simply how the changing dynamic of the education market has
affected individual choices, it is possible to extend her analysis beyond this narrow scope
and apply it to a herding framework to identify individuals who are making irrational
decisions.
Since the author hypothesizes that individuals have altered the way in which they
consider their college options, the paper attempts to examine how individuals from 1972,
1982, and 1992 chose whether to and where to attend college by estimating the
importance of postsecondary costs and quality. This is applicable and important to the
research question because it evaluates the decision of the individual. That is, by looking
at person-specific factors, the paper improves on past research by using more
individualistic characteristics rather than relying upon aggregated data (Long, 2003). In
addition, the article claims to be the first to examine how the decision process has
changed over time and how the role of price, quality, and distance has transformed based
on the choices of individuals (Long, 2003).
The paper addresses two questions: how individuals decide between colleges,
conditional on attendance, and how individuals decide whether to attend at all. The
author notes that previous literature does provide estimates of the effect of price at
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different times in the past, but points out that they are not comparable because each study
involves different controls, different econometric models, and different data samples that
have not been adjusted in order to provide comparable results (Long, 2003). The author
stresses that it is important to study change over time because beyond influencing the
enrollment decision, price may also affect which college an individual may choose. This
is especially the case as it is becoming more important to not only attend college, but to
choose a college that provides the best possible return (Long, 2003).
Long (2003) also argues that college quality has largely been ignored in previous
literature. Although some studies have considered how it affects the return on the
investment, it also has the ability to affect the ex ante decision of students (Long, 2003).
The author reasons that this is increasingly important as the market is transitioning from a
local market to a nationally integrated market, thus driving colleges to compete for
students based on the quality of their institution and educational products rather than
simply price (Long, 2003).
The author also insists that distance to college is an important factor to include in
the decision model as well. A shift in the market to become more nationally competitive
(paired with advances in transportation and communication), as well as the increased
availability of college information, implies that distance to college is an important factor
that must be assessed. Its inclusion is necessary to truly examine how the college
enrollment decision has changed over time, allowing for a more complete insight into
how students make decisions of whether, and where, to attend college (Long, 2003). This
may also provide a better understanding of how individuals process information and yield
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a stronger grasp on where the signal they receive can be distorted, hence generating
irrational decisions.
The theoretical framework presented assumes that an individual has J colleges to
choose from. Any individual college, j, can be described by a vector of characteristics,
Yj, including measures such as prices, resources available for students, and location, for
example (Long, 2003). Then, relating to both the human capital model and utility
maximization framework based on preferences, Long (2003) indicates that the individual
will infer how much value-added each school will produce for her human capital and the
consumption goods the college offers. Further, the author introduces another vector, Xi,
which contains the individual’s characteristics such as high-school performance and
family income, which are likely to affect the individual’s demand for education and her
opportunity set (Long, 2003).
Then, the value of the jth college to the ith decision maker may be given by U(Yj,
Xi). The author clarifies that utility may have random elements so that all individuals are
not assumed to have the same tastes. Individuals then compare the potential returns to
attending different colleges, as well as the option to not enroll at all (implying they would
enter the labor market immediately). This reflects how the decision to attend college is
made up of two choices. That is, after determining the best college option, the individual
must then decide whether to attend the college at all, ultimately deciding upon the choice
that maximizes lifetime utility subject to her budget constraint (Long, 2003).
To empirically understand the how individuals make their college decisions, the
author asserts that an empirical model should investigate the tradeoffs between the
opportunity chosen and the available alternatives that are not selected. For this reason,
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she uses the conditional logistical regression model, also referred to as McFadden’s
choice model, since it exploits extensive detailed information on alternatives. That is, the
variables of the conditional logistical regression model are choice-specific attributes
rather than individual-specific characteristics. Specifically, this methodology allows for
over 2,000 possible college alternatives and considers important match-specific
information between the individual and the college (Long, 2003).
To estimate the conditional logit, the author organizes the data as pair-wise
combinations of each student i with each school j with the observations stratified by
individual into groups of j. Then, the conditional logit model is made up of j equations,
using these combinations, for each individual i, with each equation describing one of the
alternatives (Long, 2003). This format is beneficial because it takes into account matchspecific variables based on the interaction of individual i with college j. The conditional
logit model is then capable of determining the probability of enrollment at each of the
colleges in the stratum relative to all other alternatives, with the dependent variable equal
to one for the alternative that was chosen (Long, 2003).
Long (2003) uses three data sources that provide information on high-school
graduates from 1972 to 1992. The NLS72, the HSB, and the NELS, 1988 deliver
information on the backgrounds and college decisions of individuals who graduated from
high school in 1972, 1982, and 1992, respectively. The data was all collected by the
National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) with the explicit purpose of being made
to be comparable to each other (Long, 2003).
To gather information on college costs, quality, and location, Long (2003) uses
several sources. The Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and its
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predecessor, the Higher Education General Information Survey (HEGIS), were used to
furnish institutional characteristics and financial data. Supplementary data on median
student-body scores was taken from Cass’ and Brinbaum’s Comparative Guide to
American Colleges for the 1971-1972 school year and Barron’s Profiles of American
Colleges for the 1981-1982 and 1991-1992 school years. Data on faculty quality was
based on data from the College Board’s Annual Survey of Colleges.
Employing the conditional logistic model, the author matches each student with
each possible college. College price, distance, and quality are defined as follows. Each
student is assigned the in-state tuition price if they live in the designated state. To glean a
better sense of net price, the amount of Federal Pell Grants that a student could expect to
receive was subtracted from the list tuition price. Distance was calculated by comparing
the zip codes of the college and high school attended by each person. Finally, quality
was measured using the median SAT score of the college’s student body as well as
instructional expenditures per student. To compute faculty quality, the author uses the
college’s student-faculty ratio and the percentage of the faculty with a Ph.D. To control
for supply constraints, she also includes admissions constraints to prevent the model from
predicting that individuals with low test scores will attend highly selective institutions. In
addition, the author includes undergraduate full-time equivalent (FTE) enrollment, which
allows for the fact that larger schools have a higher level of visibility and are able to
admit more students, thus giving these schools greater choice probability (Long, 2003).
Then, using the conditional logistic choice model, estimates are obtained of how
the attributes of a college affect the probability of each individual choosing to attend that
college, conditional on attending any postsecondary institution. Not surprisingly,
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distance and tuition price negatively affect the likelihood of a student choosing a college,
all else equal, whereas college quality positively affects the student’s choice (Long,
2003). However, a comparison across cohorts indicates that the significance of these
factors has changed over time (Long, 2003).
Price has played a declining role and the role of distance has also weakened
(Long, 2003). The author finds that college quality was not an important factor in the
college decision for the 1972 and 1982 cohorts, but played a more important role for the
class of 1992. Specifically, students from the 1992 cohort were more likely to choose
schools that have higher scores than their own (Long, 2003). To help alleviate the
concern that the differences may be related to the changing makeup of college-bound
students rather than real changes in decision making patterns, the author standardizes
later cohorts to reflect the 1972 population. This revealed that the negative influence of
price on college as well as the role of distance weakened. The importance of quality,
however, increased for more recent cohorts (Long, 2003).
The author also used a second method of reducing the differences between the
cohorts by limiting the sample to students with specific characteristics. Similar results
were found, but low-income students in later cohorts were still found to be sensitive to
price. This implies that even after advancements in financial aid programs, price
negatively impacted the choices of graduates in 1982 and 1992 in a manner similar to the
way it influenced the class of 1972. However, high-ability students did not exhibit as
much sensitivity to price (Long, 2003).
Although this model estimates the choice between colleges, the individual must
also decide whether to attend college at all. The author maintains that it is acceptable to
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treat the enrollment and choice decisions separately, contending that it is equivalent to
determining the choices of students using backward induction, similar to how it is
considered in game theory (Long, 2003). To estimate the decision to attend, she uses a
logistic model, which controls for family background, student achievement, and the
unemployment rate of the individual’s county (Long, 2003).
Similar to deciding between colleges, Long (2003) investigates how college
characteristics affect the likelihood of an individual to enroll in college in general,
estimating specifically the effect of price, distance, and quality on the decision to attend.
The results show that the role of price and distance has fallen in terms of enrollment
while quality did not play a role in determining whether an individual from any cohort
chose to attend college (Long, 2003). Specifically, for the class of 1992, with the
acceptance of distance, no college characteristic is estimated to have statistically
significant effects on enrollment. The author points out that this may suggest that capital
constraints are no longer a major deterrent in college decisions (Long, 2003).
From the analysis conducted on the college enrollment decision, it is possible to
see a more competitive education market has emerged in terms of deciding between
schools. The results suggest that quality has recently played a stronger role in
determining which college to attend, conditional on enrollment (Long, 2003). It appears
that earning a degree is no longer sufficient, but that it is also important to earn a degree
of a certain prestige and caliber. If individuals are enrolling in larger numbers, they must
compete with one another to earn a respected degree that signals to employers a higher
worth in the labor force.
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The results also illustrate that the role of college costs in the enrollment decision
has been found to decrease over the time period, suggesting the factors beyond capital
constraints play a role in in the decision making process (Long, 2003). As an extension
of the author’s model, it may be the case that students use other factors beyond price
(such are herding) to aid in making their decisions. This may imply that decision makers
are using irrelevant information to choose between colleges as well as whether to attend
or not.
If individuals are receiving signals about factors beyond price alone, this suggests
that the human capital model is not sufficient on its own in evaluating the college
investment decision. In addition, as distance becomes less of an important factor,
individuals have an increasing amount of colleges to choose from. This provides
individuals with an abundance of choices, likely presenting the decision maker with an
overwhelming amount of information and a daunting choice. Thus, in regards to the
search process and information costs, it is probable that students are using some method,
such as herding, to lessen the burden of sorting through information. This is especially
the case since, as Long (2003) mentions, the market for education has shifted from a local
market to a more nationally-integrated market.

3.5: “Overeducation” in the Labor Market
In regards to the returns on the investment in higher education, Sicherman (1991)
declares that a potentially problematic observation is that a large number of workers
report a discrepancy between their own level of schooling and the level of schooling that
is required by their job. For this reason, he attempts to examine the causes of this

78

observed discrepancy and the resulting differences in returns to schooling. He argues that
the synchronization between the education system and the labor market has been a major
concern for several decades among educators, policymakers, and social scientists
(Sicherman, 1991). Although this may reflect disequilibrium or inefficiency in the labor
market and/or the schooling system, it also has the potential to reveal irrational decisions
made by individuals if the return they realize does not equate to what was initially
expected.
Sicherman (1991) explains that his article is motivated by two stylized facts.
First, workers in occupations that require less schooling they what they have actually
received are classified as ‘overeducated.’ Generally, they earn lower wages than workers
with similar levels of schooling who hold jobs that require the level of schooling they
have actually obtained. Nonetheless, these overeducated workers do earn more than their
coworkers who have less education (but is the required amount for the job). The author
insists that this implies inefficiency, as overeducated workers should be considered as
underutilized workers (Sicherman, 1991).
As an extension, this may relate to how individuals are making their decisions to
invest in higher education. If there exists a high amount of overeducated workers, it may
be the case that herding is taking place if workers are forced to take lower-level positions
simply because they cannot get jobs aligning with their actual level of schooling.
Further, if overeducated workers are indeed receiving lower wages (relative to those with
similar levels of education that hold jobs requiring this level of education), this could
suggest that there is an oversupply of educated workers, leading to a decrease in realized
earnings.
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The second stylized fact presented is that undereducated workers, those who hold
jobs that require more schooling that they have obtained, receive higher wages than
workers with the same level of schooling who work in jobs that actually require their
level of schooling. However, they do earn less than coworkers with a higher level of
education (Sicherman, 1991).
Sicherman (1991) then aims to explore discrepancies between actual and required
levels of schooling, and the resulting differences in the returns to schooling, by using a
human capital mobility framework. The author’s goal is to provide a better
understanding of relations among schooling, the patterns of wages, and workers’ mobility
across firms and occupations. However, the article also has the potential to garner
information on the effects of herding and an oversupply of educated workers in the labor
force, suggesting a decision making process that may not be rational for some
individuals.
The author first suggests that a possible explanation for such discrepancies
involves the potential tradeoff between schooling and other components concerning the
level of human capital. For example, he suggests that on-the-job training may makeup
for a lack of education, which thus only indicates on the surface that workers are
undereducated. In other words, workers may qualify for similar jobs even if they hold
different levels of schooling because it is possible that they hold comparable levels of
human capital (Sicherman, 1991). Hence, it is important to remember that schooling is
not the only thing that increases human capital. Rather, it includes anything that
enhances the workers skills and ability to perform in the labor market. The author also
mentions that other factors, such as more or less market experience as well as more or
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less innate, unmeasured ability are also examples of factors that contribute to human
capital (Sicherman, 1991).
The author’s second hypothesis is that such discrepancies occur due to the
mobility patterns of workers. That is, he believes that the phenomenon can at least in part
be attributed to how individuals move between firms and occupations (Sicherman, 1991).
Based on this hypothesis, Sicherman (1990) presents two theories that could explain a
temporary discrepancy.
First, the matching theory suggests that a mismatch between the worker and the
job exists, indicating simply a bad match in the short run. It is assumed that the
employee will eventually change her job to one in which he she is better qualified for to
correct the problem (Sicherman, 1991). The second theory, career mobility, predicts that
workers may temporarily work in mismatched jobs in order to advance their career in the
future. In other words, the skills they obtain from the current job may be used at a later
point to help with a higher-level job (Sicherman, 1991). Although the author presented
several explanations for overeducation, the paper chooses to focus specifically on these
two theories.
Sicherman (1991) uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to obtain
data. From this, he uses a sample of male heads of households, aged 18-60 to test his
hypothesis. He then conducts a cross-sectional analysis with the 1976 and 1978 waves of
the PSID, while the mobility models are estimated on the 1976-77 and 1978-79 waves.
For the 1976 and 1978 waves, participants were asked how much formal education was
required to get the job that they currently hold, with answers bracketed into seven classes:
0-5, 6-8, 9-11, 12, 13-15, 16, 17 (Sicherman, 1991).
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Based on this information, individuals are defined as over or undereducated if
their reported years of schooling lie outside the reported range of required years of
schooling (Sicherman, 1991). The results indicate that about 40% of the workers in the
sample were considered to be overeducated while 16% were undereducated. Further
analysis reveals that overeducated workers on average did receive less on-the-job
training, while undereducated workers reported more on-the-job training (Sicherman,
1991).
This supports the hypothesis that skills obtained by labor market experience may
be substituted for insufficient schooling (Sicherman, 1991). Nonetheless, the prevalence
of overeducation, as compared to undereducation, does possibly suggest an oversupply of
educated workers if students are investing in education beyond what is actually required.
It is not unreasonable to assume that this could potentially be affected by herding.
In regards to the matching theory, the author uses a regression model to estimate
the likelihood that individuals with over/underschooling will change firms or
occupations. Important variables include the number of years of schooling, experience in
the career field, whether the individual is a member of a union, the individual’s race, city
size, and whether the individual is married, disabled, and currently overeducated or
undereducated. The results confirm that workers with years of schooling that deviate
from those required on the job have higher probabilities of changing both their
occupation and their firm, indicating a bad match (Sicherman, 1991). They author further
hypothesizes that undereducated workers should experience a higher incidence of layoffs.
However, this is rejected by the empirical results. No evidence supports the notion of a
good or bad match in this case between the worker and the firm (Sicherman, 1991).
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Sicherman (1991) next examines the theory of career mobility. He notes that an
occupational change is defined to occur when the two-digit occupational category in the
PSID reported by the worker in two successive surveys is different. In basic terms, it is
assumed that an occupation change occurs if there is an apparent change in the tasks
performed by the worker (Sicherman, 1991). Occupational mobility that results from
career mobility is considered mobility in the sense that the individual moves to a higherlevel occupation. This is measured by vertical distance and is calculated by measuring
the difference in the mean levels of human capital needed to work in the occupation after
required training is completed (Sicherman, 1991).
An example that the author gives to illustrate this phenomenon is of a police
officer. Both a high school and college graduate may choose to enter their careers at this
same level, that is, as a police officer. However, as opposed to the high school graduate,
the college graduate is most likely using this entry-level position to obtain necessary
skills to advance his career in the future. He may be promoted to sergeant or leave the
institution to become a private detective (another higher-level occupation). Therefore,
career mobility assumes that it is reasonable for workers to take on jobs in which the
schooling requirements are lower than actual schooling levels (Sicherman, 1991).
Since this trend involves the case of overeducation (as opposed to
undereducation), the author makes the decision to focus his study on this scenario only.
He anticipates that workers who are overeducated are more likely to move to a higherlevel occupation and higher wage level. Using the PSID and a regression model with the
same key variables used for the matching theory, the empirical results suggest that
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overeducated workers are indeed more likely to move to higher-level occupations than
workers with the required level of schooling (Sicherman, 1991).
As a critique to his own work, Sicherman (1991) does mention that the
discrepancy between actual and required schooling and observed wage differentials could
be the effect of quality difference between different groups. In other words,
overeducated workers may be classified as so if the quality of education they receive is
lower or if they lack a general ability to perform based on individual characteristics. The
opposite may also exist for undereducated workers (Sicherman, 1991). However, this
argument is not tested nor included in Sicherman’s model.
Although the author’s models investigate why overeducation and discrepancies
occur between the worker’s actual level of schooling and that which is required, the
implications of overeducation go beyond what is directly analyzed, possibly providing a
link to herding behavior. In support of this, Sicherman (1991) does note an increase in
college attainment in the United States resulting from the baby boom generation reaching
college age. This may have lead to the resulting reduction in the returns to schooling,
reviving the notion of overeducation (Sicherman, 1991). Although the author perceives
this as mostly a temporary situation, this does not mean that the consequences are not
long lasting.
If the market for labor cannot adjust to such a situation, equilibrium will be
distorted, suggesting the ex ante decisions made by individuals may differ from what is
actually experienced. The paper attempts to provide an explanation for overeducation,
supporting logical explanations for discrepancies. However, it does not necessarily
consider how large numbers of people making the choice for higher education may
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distort, for example, a tradeoff between schooling and other forms of human capital.
Inefficiency must be viewed and judged in a broader context, as the author admits
himself.
Although discrepancies may occur due to mismatches between the worker and the
job at the beginning stages of her career, this may not account for all situations. It is also
possible that individuals are taking lower-level positions because they have to. The
empirical result that overeducated workers earn less than comparable individuals who
hold jobs that require their same level of education suggests that the investment is less
valuable to those who are not able to take a job that matches their actual level of
schooling. Even if this only occurs at the start of a career, it may nonetheless still reduce
wages over the individual’s lifetime. Thus, it is important to understand why
overeducation is occurring and the implications it has on the investment decision and
potential irrational choices being made by decision makers.

3.6: Conclusion
Each of the articles presented examines aspects related to the decision process
involving the investment in higher education. Hussey and Swinton (2011) provide a
framework for analyzing the return to education and stress that ex ante expected returns
should be evaluated based on more than just the average return to earning a bachelor’s
degree. Ability, personal characteristics, school selectivity, and probability of completion
are all important factors to take into consideration. This provides a more holistic
approach to the human capital model by incorporating additional predictors of the
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expected earnings. In addition, this allows for a better analysis of how individuals are
processing information as well as how the decision relates to individual preferences.
This may be taken to the next level in researching graduate school decisions, as
explored by Bedard and Herman (2003). Further, as differential pricing is more common
at graduate institutions, analyzing this decision is likely to reduce the effects of
subsidizing, as illustrated by Stange (2013). If individual-specific characteristics are
incorporated, such as undergraduate field and ability, it is easier to identify how
individuals are affected by certain signals and information that extend beyond the rational
environment.
In addition, by researching the choice to enroll in graduate school, this may
reduce extra ‘noise’ associated with the decision making process, possibly making it
easier to isolate irrational decisions. As Long (2003) points out, this may be especially
important to consider in a more nationally integrated market for education. By looking at
what information individuals do rely on to make decisions, it may be possible to
determine how decision makers are processing signals and if herding is occurring to aid
in the search process by reducing information costs.
This may potentially be measured by evaluating what types of occupations
individuals are entering. If workers are overeducated, as addressed by Sicherman (1991),
it may be the case that there is an oversupply of educated workers who are receiving
returns that are lower than expected, based on the ex ante decision. This has the potential
to support a herding model and illustrate how some individuals may be making irrational
decisions to enroll in college according to how they process information when engaging
in the decision process.
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IV. Model Specification
Just as enrollment in undergraduate education is trending upward, so too is the
enrollment in graduate school (“Fast Facts,” 2012). This phenomenon presents an
opportunity to proxy for herding within the context of higher education. The following
chapter outlines an empirical approach to investigating the effects of earning a higher
degree in the face of potential herding behavior and an increasing labor supply. The
method for analyzing the investment decision is based upon the human capital model.
This implies that that the decision to invest is deemed rational if the payoff of attending
proves to be greater than alternatives the individual could have realized if she had
gathered information on her own.
Although herding behavior has primarily been discussed in the context of
undergraduate education, the empirical model defined discusses the payoff of continuing
education beyond an undergraduate degree and the implications associated with this
decision. Since an individual’s earnings is the basis of analysis in determining if the
investment is worthwhile, the model attempts to examine the difference in earnings
between those who have obtained bachelor’s degrees relative to higher degrees,
hypothesizing that graduate school will not result in as high of a payoff compared to
earning an undergraduate degree.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure is introduced in terms of its
original use in measuring discrimination, and is then extended to investigate the earnings
difference between degree types by decomposing this difference. This will allow for a
better understanding of the payoff associated with earning a higher degree in the presence
of increasing enrollment. An earnings function is also specified in order to define
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regression equations necessary for the decomposition procedure. Lastly, The National
Survey of College Graduates is presented and discussed, as it will serve as the dataset
used for the empirical testing.

4.1: The Graduate School Decision
The empirical model used to investigate the prevalence of herding in the decision
to pursue higher education is based on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method.
Before applying this method, however, it is first essential to describe how a rational
decision will be defined according to this paper. When evaluating an individual’s choice,
the human capital model will be employed to follow the traditional framework used to
analyze an individual’s decision to invest in college. This model is appropriate to use
based on its prevalence within economic theory and because of its simplicity, allowing
the decision to be evaluated based on pecuniary benefits. If an individual makes a choice
to invest in higher education, it is assumed that she does so because she is enhancing her
ability to perform or produce labor at a higher quality and economic value. Thus, she
should earn a higher return if she chooses to invest, relative to not investing.
Although herding behavior has been discussed in terms of undergraduate degrees,
it nonetheless pertains to the decision to obtain degrees beyond a bachelor’s degree as
well. If herding is indeed taking place, more and more people should be attending school
today. Based on The National Center for Education Statistics, the primary federal entity
for collecting and analyzing data related to education, enrollment has increased in recent
years:
Enrollment in degree-granting institutions increased by 11 percent between 1990
and 2000. Between 2000 and 2010, enrollment increased 37 percent, from 15.3

88

million to 21.0 million. Much of the growth between 2000 and 2010 was in fulltime enrollment; the number of full-time students rose 45 percent, while the
number of part-time students rose 26 percent. During the same time period, the
number of females rose 39 percent, while the number of males rose 35 percent.
Enrollment increases can be affected both by population growth and by rising
rates of enrollment. (“Fast Facts,” 2012)
The theory of herding suggests that as more students are currently attending college,
many may feel as if they need to attend graduate school to set themselves apart and
distinguish themselves in the labor market.
In this sense, herding may cause graduate school to be viewed today as more of a
necessity. With an increase in demand for undergraduate education, more students may
feel as is if pursuing an even higher degree has become less of a choice and more of a
requirement. Those who choose to attend may base their decisions upon what they
observe their peers doing, as well as those individuals who made similar decisions in
prior years.
In the presence of herding, it is expected that the payoff of attending graduate
school will not be as high as initially expected. In the past, there may not have been as
much pressure to pursue higher education, so only those students who were intrinsically
interested in pursuing a degree for personal preferences did so. This would, therefore,
result in a higher payoff for attending graduate school in the past based on a lower supply
of highly educated students entering the labor market.
This is not to say that attending graduate school will generate no payoff for the
individual today. Rather, it may be the case that the payoff is less than initially expected.
For this reason, the decision to invest may be irrational in terms of the human capital
investment model. If an individual is expecting certain returns and instead receives a
return lower than anticipated, this may signal an irrational decision. This is based on the
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argument that too many people are following the choices made by those who have gone
before them. This does not suggest that every individual making the decision to attend
graduate school is engaging in an irrational decision. Instead, this suggests that some of
these people are choosing an option that is less beneficial than an alternative, based on
the pecuniary analysis presented by the human capital theory.
In other words, herding has the potential to induce irrational decisions if
individuals are realizing returns that are lower than an alternative they could have
realized if they had acquired information on their own. These alternatives may include
entering the labor force immediately, or perhaps even just choosing a different area of
study. Therefore, for some individuals, the outcome of their choice is an irrational
decision directly related to herding. If they would have made their decision based on
other information, rather than just succumbing to the signal they gleaned from herding,
they could have possibly made a better decision that led to a better outcome.
If it is true that a bachelor’s degree is becoming a basic requirement for obtaining
a decent job, then it may be reasonable to assume that the returns to a bachelor’s degree
will most likely offer a higher return on the investment, relative to a graduate degree.
This does not mean that those with higher degrees will not earn higher salaries. Instead,
this suggests that the return, relative to the investment, may not be as high for a graduate
degree. That is, each degree earned is expected to have decreasing returns in regards to
earnings, especially in the face of herding. Obtaining a bachelor’s degree may allow a
person to jump from a minimum wage job to a career with a salary. However, a graduate
degree is not as likely to offer such a significant return relative to an undergraduate
degree, especially in the present as compared to the past.
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If individuals make their decision to attend school based on what they witness
their peers doing, or based on the decisions made by those in the past, they may
encounter a return that is less than originally perceived. Although those with higher
degrees do typically earn more, the herding model suggests that they are merely not
earning as much as expected, or as much as in previous years, especially relative to a
bachelor’s degree.

4.2: The Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Procedure
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure can be used to analyze the effects
of herding by applying this model to an earnings function. This procedure is most
commonly used to measure the effects of discrimination (Hoffman & Averett, 2010).
Typically, the model is applied to understand the proportion of the gender gap in earnings
that is the result of ‘other factors’ (mainly discrimination). The rest of the percentage is
what can be attributed to an actual difference in skills (Hoffman & Averett, 2010).
Although a more complex earnings function will be defined latter, for simplicity,
assume that a single variable, X, determines an individual’s earnings and accounts for his
or her skill level. In other words, X accounts for the individual’s total amount of human
capital. It follows that:
𝑌! = 𝛽𝑋! +    𝜀!
In this equation, Y accounts for earnings. Further, if 𝑌 stands for average earnings and 𝑋
stands for average level of skills, it must be that:
𝑌 =    𝛽𝑋
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This simple equation is telling because it indicates that only two things may account for
differences in earnings. It must be the case that either 𝑋 is different between the two
groups or 𝛽 is different. If 𝑋 is different, then the difference in earnings can be
accounted for by differences in human capital. However, if 𝛽 is the variable that differs,
the difference is likely due to discrimination (Hoffman & Averett, 2010).
To determine how much of the difference is accounted for by skills and how
much by discrimination (or other factors), regression analysis can be used, supplemented
by the application of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure. It is first necessary to
determine regression equations for each group, estimated separately (Hoffman & Averett,
2010). Although the analysis above is primarily used to interpret discrimination that
females most often face, it can also be applied to understand possible effects of herding.
Instead of measuring how discrimination affects earnings, it would be more useful to
think of discrimination, in this scenario, as the effects of herding.
In terms of gender, part of the reason that men make more is because some of
them do have higher skill levels. The rest is attributed to ‘other factors.' Similarly, in the
scenario outlined by this paper, those with higher degrees will earn more in part because
they have a higher skill level. However, if those earning a graduate degree do not receive
the same level of reward as seen in earning a bachelor’s degree, this can, likewise, be
attributed to ‘other factors.’ Herding indicates that the payoff is not just a result of
differing levels of human capital, but also the effect of other factors that may induce
irrational decisions.
Separating our sample into two subgroups such that one group contains
individuals who have earned a bachelor’s degree with the other group consisting of those
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individuals with higher degrees (any degree above a bachelor’s degree), two regression
equations can be determined. They are written as follows:
𝑌!" =    𝛽!" 𝑋!" for higher degrees and 𝑌! =    𝛽! 𝑋! for bachelor’s degrees
Then, the difference in average earnings based on degree type can be written as:
𝑌!" −    𝑌! =    𝛽!" 𝑋!" −    𝛽! 𝑋!
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure, written below, then allows for the
difference to be separated and explained in terms of ‘difference due to qualifications’ as
well as an ‘unexplained’ difference. The ‘difference due to qualifications’ is the first
term on the right-hand side of the equation and the ‘unexplained’ difference is the second
term on the right-hand side:
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = (𝑌!" − 𝑌!∗ ) + (𝑌!∗ − 𝑌! )
(Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 2014)

Then, these components can be broken down, such that:
𝑌!" = 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!"
𝑌! = 𝛽! ! + 𝛽! !   ×  𝑋!
𝑌!∗ = 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!
(Blau et al., 2014)

Substitution of these terms into the original equation then allows for an easier analysis of
what exactly the ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ difference accounts for in terms of the
theory outlined in this paper.
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Substitution yields:
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = 𝑌!" − 𝑌!∗ + 𝑌!∗ − 𝑌!   
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = [ 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!" − 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋! ] + [ 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!
− 𝛽! ! + 𝛽! !   ×  𝑋! ]  
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = [𝛽! !"   ×   𝑋!" −    𝑋! ] + [ 𝛽! !" − 𝛽! ! + 𝛽! !" − 𝛽! !   ×    𝑋! ]
(Hoffman & Averett, 2010)

The first term on the right-hand side of the equation is the difference in skill level
displayed by varying degree types multiplied by 𝛽! !" , the value of a unit of X for those
with higher degrees. In other words, this is obtained by taking the difference in the
average level of human capital for those with higher degrees and bachelor’s degrees and
multiplying it by the higher degree regression coefficients. This represents the dollar
amount of the earnings difference that can be attributed to actual differences in skill.
This is typically referred to as the ‘explained’ portion of the earnings difference
(Hoffman & Averett, 2010).
The second term on the right-hand side of the equation accounts for the
‘unexplained’ portion of the difference in earnings between the two groups. This term
measures the difference in the market value of skills for each degree type multiplied by
the average skill level of those with bachelor’s degrees. This, therefore, measures the
dollar amount of the earnings gap that is the result of differences in monetary return or
reward for skills (Hoffman & Averett, 2010). It can be thought of as how much those
with bachelor’s degrees would earn if they were rewarded in the same way as those who
earn a higher degree are (retaining their current skill level). Basically, this portion is
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determined by the difference between what those with bachelor’s degrees earnings are
when their average level of human capital is evaluated using the higher degree regression
versus when they are evaluated using the bachelor’s degree regression (Hoffman &
Averett, 2010).
Then, dividing each of these terms by the total earnings difference (the left-hand
side of the equation) yields the explained and unexplained portions in percentage terms,
allowing researchers to state what percent of the earnings gap is due to unexplained
factors (Hoffman & Averett, 2010).

4.3: Explained and Unexplained Portions in Terms of the Hypothesis
In terms of the hypothesis that graduate school does not generate as high of a
payoff as undergraduate school (relative to the investment), this indicates that the
unexplained portion of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition should be rather small since
this portion would be linked to the effects of irrational decisions made by individuals in
terms of receiving a payoff that is not as large as originally presumed. Looking at what
this portion represents mathematically ( 𝛽! !" − 𝛽! !   ×  𝑋! ), the main determinant of this
figure is the difference in regression coefficients between those who have earned higher
degrees and those who have earned bachelor’s degrees.
The hypothesis argues that earning a higher degree will not result in a huge
increase in payoff, relative to a bachelor’s degree. That is, the regression coefficients
should not be all that different. Since the difference between them should be small, it
follows that the unexplained portion should also be small within this framework.
Appealing to common sense, this makes sense because it is the opposite of the gender gap
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model, which asserts that men are making much more than women due to ‘other factors.’
On the contrary, this model suggests that those with higher degrees are not making that
much more than those with bachelor’s degrees, implying that this portion should thus be
small.
This directly relates to the effects of herding and the premise that earning a
graduate degree in the face of an increasing labor supply should result in a lower return,
relative to a bachelor’s degree. This is not to say that those with higher degrees will earn
less than those with bachelor’s degrees. Rather, it is saying that the return on the
investment of earning a higher degree is not as great as the return for a bachelor’s degree.
For this reason, the unexplained portion is of particular importance to the hypothesis in
understanding and explaining the effects of herding within the context of higher
education.
The explained portion, on the other hand, should assess differences in earnings
that are simply a result of higher skill levels. This is expected to be larger than the
unexplained portion if differences in earnings are linked to more than just obtaining a
higher degree, but to other factors that contribute to human capital as well, such as
experience or training. Clearly, a majority of the decomposition must be attributed to this
or else human capital would play no role at all. Based on the mathematical calculation of
this portion (𝛽! !"   ×   𝑋!" −    𝑋! ), if the difference between the levels of human capital
between each subsample was zero, then the amount of human capital that an individual
accrues plays no role in their earnings. This is certainly not expected since the human
capital theory indicates that an individual obtains more human capital to earn more in the
long run. It may be other forms of human capital, however, (as opposed to schooling)
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that play a more significant role in regards to earnings, especially if herding results in a
decrease in the value of a higher degree.
Further, as discussed previously, those who earn a higher degree are anticipated
to earn more. Some occupations require graduate degrees and are therefore expected to
pay a higher salary. The decision to obtain a higher degree only becomes irrational when
the individual makes choices based on ‘unreliable’ signals, such as herding, that result in
a payoff that is less than what is expected and less than the outcome of an alternative
choice. Those with higher degrees, and therefore higher levels of human capital, should,
in theory, earn more. However, the payoff may indeed fall short of initial expectations.
Nonetheless, it is not so easy to describe an earnings function based on one
variable, X, that accounts for an individual’s entire stock of human capital. Instead, an
individual’s earnings model is likely to be based on a variety of factors.

4.4: The Earnings Function
First and foremost, earnings functions are usually written in log-linear form. This
is because the independent variables are expected to have a non-constant impact on
earnings. The log-linear form dictates that a unit change in an X variable will result in a
𝛽 ∗ 100 percent change in Y. This is useful in describing the expected concave
appearance of an earnings graph, depicted in the human capital model. For the empirical
model used in this paper, earnings are based on total earned annual income before
deductions.
Aside from investment in human capital being the major contributor to an
individual’s earnings function, demographic characteristics are no less important
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variables to consider. An individual’s age is a reasonable variable to consider when
determining the amount an employee will earn. Typically, the older a person is, the more
money he or she will make. Since this paper would like to test the effects of acquiring
higher education on earnings, and essentially, whether the investment is worthwhile, it is
sensible to look at recent graduates. This is because their earnings are more likely to
reflect and isolate the effects of the degree earned. For this reason, the model will
address individuals in a five-year age range, from 28 to 33. This is meant to control for
other unknown factors that would be affecting an individual’s salary beyond their
educational attainment. By using recent graduates, the hope is that their earnings will
show evidence of the effects of herding before other forms of human capital influence the
individual’s salary more heavily.
As pointed out by the use of the typical Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure,
women are likely to earn less than men. Although some of this can be accounted for
based on differences in skill level and human capital, discrimination as well as ‘other
factors,’ (such a cultural and societal influences, for example) are also likely to attribute
to a common trend of women earning less than men. For this reason, sex must be
incorporated in the model to account for differences in earnings between men and
women. The prediction is that being female will negatively affect earnings, despite the
level of degree earned.
Race, as well, plays a large role in determining the earnings of an individual. As
with sex, this may be due to actual differences in human capital attainment, a bias or
discrimination on the demand-side of labor, or because of larger societal issues. For
example, African Americans are often cited as earning less than their white counterparts.
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This may be due to inherent discrimination or perhaps a reflection of some other societal
factor. Along similar lines, those of Asian descent are likely to earn more because many
Asian cultures place a heavy emphasis on achieving academic success, focusing on
studying, and earning high grades. This is likely to spill over in the labor force, with the
prediction that Asians are pressured to work harder, contributing to higher earnings.
Thus, race must be included to capture characteristics that are not included
elsewhere but nonetheless affect earnings. The earnings function outlined in this paper
will include two dummy variables to account for different ethnicities. These dummy
variables represent African American and Asians. The third, implicit category that these
variables are being compared against is White/Caucasian.
Beyond demographic variables, however, the human capital model draws mainly
upon the variables of educational attainment and experience. Clearly, education is
accounted for in each regression since two equations are run separately for the two
subgroups: those who have earned a bachelor’s degree and those who have earned higher
degrees. Experience, however, must be included in the equation to account for factors
such as on-the-job training. This no doubt contributes to earnings and accounts for a
significant portion of an individual’s human capital. Although the analysis is attempting
to look at recent college graduates (who thus have less experience) to capture the initial
effects of each degree type on earnings, experience still must be included to account for
different qualifications that each individual possesses.
Nonetheless, there is expected to be a non-linear relationship that exists between
experience and earnings. Typically, experience has a positive effect on earnings, but at a
decreasing rate. Thus, a quadratic must be employed within the earnings function to
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reflect the inverted U-shape of the relationship. This implies that earnings will increase
(at a decreasing rate) up until a turning point, where it will then decrease with increasing
experience. Thus, the experience variable must also be included as a squared variable (in
addition to the original experience variable) to account for the effects of experience over
time. This is standard approach and again is compatible with the human capital model,
which depicts the earnings graph to be increasing at a decreasing rate.
From the above description of the earnings function, it follows that the regression
equation should look as follows, where the variable Y denotes earnings (total earned
annual income before deductions):
ln 𝑌 = 𝛽! + 𝛽! 𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝛽! 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙e +    𝛽! 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 +    𝛽! 𝐵𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑘 +    𝛽! 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 +    𝛽! 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 !

Note, again, that the variable for education is not included since it will be accounted for
using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure when running the regressions for the
two subgroups.

4.5: Data
The source used to provide data for the empirical analysis is The National Survey
of College Graduates (NSCG). This survey is a longitudinal survey conducted every
other year. The NSCG has taken place since the 1970s to provide data on the nation’s
college graduates, with particular focus on those in the science and engineering
workforce (National Science Foundation, 2010). This is useful in that the data source
itself controls partially for differences in degrees and occupations. Those who have been
surveyed are mostly those individuals who have earned similar degrees and pursue
comparable jobs. Thus, the data partially eliminates differences in earnings that should
occur based on differing career fields.
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In addition, STEM fields (science, technology, engineering, and math) have been
recently been noted as fields that are linked to fast-growing, high-earning occupations,
and as vital to what the nation needs in terms of growth and competition with other
countries. This should, therefore, reflect herding based on the idea that educators are
encouraging students to enter such fields. Clearly, students are receiving signals from
recent graduates, peers, and teachers that these are reliable majors to strive for.
Further, the survey requires individuals to be living in the United States during the
survey week and have at least a bachelor’s degree. This survey is also a unique source in
that it provides demographic information, educational information, and occupational
information, which therefore allows specifically for analyzing the relationship between
such characteristics.
Specifically, this paper uses the most recent cycle of the NSCG, which was
conducted in 2010. The NSCG uses a stratification sampling design to select its sample
from the eligible sampling frame. Within the sampling strata, the NSCG used probability
proportional to size or systematic random sampling techniques to select the NSCG
sample. The U.S. Census Bureau conducted the NSCG for the National Center for
Science and Engineering Statistics (NCSES). Data was collecting using both a selfadministered mail survey as well as a self-administered web survey (National Science
Foundation, 2010).
The demographic variables listed in the earnings function outlined in this paper
are all available through the NSCG. (These include age, gender, and race.) Those
individuals who were not in the outlined age range (28-33) were dropped from the data
set. The experience variable then had to be created using a proxy. Subtracting the year
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the individual earned his or her degree from 2010 (the year the survey was administered)
was the method used to generate this variable. This is a widely accepted method for
proxying for experience by assuming that these years account for on-the-job experience
and training.
The variable earnings can be described, based on the survey, as total earned
income before deductions in the previous year. Further, it must be noted that the data
was paired down to only those respondents who worked full-time, which is defined in
this paper as those individuals who work 48 hours per week or more.
In order to stratify the sample based on degree type, the individuals were divided
based on the highest degree they had earned. Respondents were able to choose one of the
following four choices to describe their degree: bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate, or
professional. Those who chose the option ‘bachelor’s degree’ as their highest degree
earned were put into a group containing only individuals who had obtained bachelor’s
degrees. Those who had chosen one of the three later degrees were placed in a second
group, accounting for ‘higher degrees.’
Of the 2,599 individuals included in the final data sample fitting the criteria
specified, 1,260 observations accounted for those who had earned a bachelor’s degree
and 1,339 observations represented those who had earned higher degrees. Thus, the data
was split fairly evenly between the two subsamples. Table 4.4.1 contains a summary of
variable names, definitions, and expected signs.
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Table 4.4.1: Variable Names and Definitions
Variable Name
logEarnings

HigherDegree

Age
Female

Asian

Black

Experience

ExperienceSquared

Description

Expected Sign

The log of total earned
income before deductions in
the previous year
Dummy variable used to
account for highest degree
type that an individual holds;
Consists of two categories:
Bachelor’s Degree and
Higher Degree (which is
made up of individual’s who
reported earning a master’s,
doctorate, or professional
degree)
Age of the individual

N/A

Dummy variable used to
account for the number of
individuals who selfidentified as female, relative
to male
Dummy variable used to
account for the number of
individuals in the sample
who identified themselves as
Asian only
Dummy variable used to
account for the number of
individuals in the sample
who identified themselves as
black only
Proxy Variable created to
account for the years of
experience an individual has;
Generated by subtracting the
year of award of the highest
degree earned from 2010 (the
year of the survey)
The number of years of
experience squared; Created
to account for the non-linear
relationship between
experience and earnings,
which is expected to be
increasing at a decreasing
rate

Negative

Positive

Positive

Positive

Negative

Positive

Negative
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4.6: Conclusion
Herding is not confined to only the decision to acquire an undergraduate degree.
This chapter has extended the herding framework to the decision to attend graduate
school, revealing how many may feel as if it is less of a choice and more of a necessity.
Nonetheless, herding still has implications for the payoff on a higher degree, especially if
the return on earning a higher degree is expected to be smaller than the return realized by
earning a bachelor’s degree.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure can be used to better understand
the difference in earnings between the two degree types based on the hypothesis of a
large explained portion and a small unexplained portion. This suggests that the two
subsamples will not exhibit significantly different regression coefficients, indicating a
small payoff in regards to attaining a higher degree. The data obtained from the National
Survey of College Graduates will be used in Chapter V to run regressions according to
the earnings function outlined, which are then examined using the decomposition
procedure.
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V. Results and Analysis
The following chapter is an extension of the model specification, applying the
National Survey of College Graduates dataset to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
procedure. This process is employed to gain an insight into the effects of herding by
decomposing the earnings difference between those who have earned a bachelor’s degree
and those who have earned a higher degree.
Before the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure is applied, a basic regression
is run using the variable HigherDegree as a dummy variable. This allows for an analysis
of the return on earnings by obtaining a higher degree before the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition is applied.
Next, a Chow test is employed to determine if the regression coefficients for the
two subsamples are equivalent. This preliminary test dictates that it is appropriate to
exercise the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure. After the decomposition is
performed, the results are discussed and it is discovered that the model may be more
useful when controlling for the variable Experience, as it differs between the two groups.
After adjusting the age range for each group to control for experience, the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure is employed again for the varying degree types.
The results, however, are not consistent with the hypothesis of a large explained portion
and a small unexplained portion. This suggests that there still exists a significant return
on earning a higher degree.
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5.1: The Basic Regression
In order to understand the earnings function outlined, it is first advantageous to
run a regression for the equation including HigherDegree as a dummy variable within the
model. This will allow for an analysis of the return on earnings by obtaining a higher
degree using a basic approach. Running a log-linear regression yields coefficients
presented in Table 5.1.1, with coefficients followed by t-scores.

Table 5.1.1: A Basic Regression Using HigherDegree as a Dummy Variable
Regression Output
HigherDegree
0.318***
(8.69)
Age
0.0271**
(2.97)
Female
-0.182***
(-6.68)
Asian
0.138***
(4.01)
Black
-0.000905
(-0.02)
Experience
0.189***
(12.30)
ExperienceSquared
-0.00939***
(-6.85)
Constant
9.357***
(35.00)
t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The regression coefficients each exhibit the anticipated sign. A single asterisk
denotes that the variable is significant at the 5% level of significance; two asterisks
indicate that the variable is significant at the 1% level; and lastly, three asterisks mean
that the variable is significant at the 0.1% level. Nonetheless, the results and significance
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of each variable cannot be taken at face value. Before the significance of each can be
accurately determined, it is necessary to also explore the correlation between the
variables.
Using the pwcorr command in Stata, the highest correlation (of 0.9546) exists
between Experience and ExperienceSquared. This result can be found in Appendix A.
Nonetheless, this is to be expected since the variable ExperienceSquared is generated
from the Experience term. No other variables exhibit unsuspected correlations that reveal
potentially problematic issues.
Further, it is also important to determine if there is evidence of multicollinearity.
Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictor variables are highly correlated such
that one can be linearly predicted from the others with little inaccuracy. This may result
in violations of the Classical Assumptions where the variances and standard errors are
inflated, thus yielding estimated coefficients that are fragile and unstable to small
changes in the sample or model specification. In addition, the t-scores will fall, making it
more likely for the researcher to commit a Type II error (the failure to reject a false null
hypothesis).
Although there is no specific method that can detect the presence of
multicollinearity, a common approach to assessing whether multicollinearity exists within
a model is to look at the variance inflation factor, or VIF. A researcher may suspect the
presence of multicollinearity if the R2 of the model is relatively high in the presence of
many insignificant variables. Since VIF =

!
!!  ! !

, a general rule of thumb is that a VIF of

five or greater may imply multicollinearity because this equates to an R2 value of 0.8.
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However, the researcher must evaluate the VIF relative to the significance of the
variables and other indicators of a well or poorly specified model.
Using the vif command in Stata for this basic regression, the generated mean VIF
is 4.40, as shown in Appendix A. Since this number is less than five and only one
variable in the model appears to be insignificant, this leads to the likely conclusion that
multicollinearity is not present within the model.
The next step is to test for heteroskedasticity within the model. This violates that
Classical Assumption that the population error term has a constant variance. Although
the presence of heteroskedasticity does not bias the regression coefficients, it does
typically lead to inefficient estimators. This is because the ordinary least squares
regression is no longer minimum variance, resulting in an underestimate of the standard
errors. This, in turn, results in an overestimation of t-scores and also invalidates the Ftest. Thus, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, a Type I error (the incorrect rejection of
a true null hypothesis) is much more likely.
The White test is used to test the null hypothesis that homoscedasticity exists.
Using Stata, the calculated chi-square is 40.24, compared to the critical value of 42.557,
for 29 degrees of freedoms at the 5% level of significance. This can again be seen in
Appendix A. Since the calculated value is less than the critical value (40.24 < 42.557),
the null hypothesis fails to be rejected, implying homoscedasticity. Thus, the model does
not need to be corrected for heteroskedasticity.
After testing for multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity, it can be determined that
it is appropriate to use the original results to run an F-test, as well as consider the
significance of each independent variable. The F-test can be employed to test the null
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hypothesis that all the slope coefficients in the equation equal zero simultaneously
(𝐻! :  𝛽! =    𝛽! = ⋯ = 𝛽! = 0). Obviously, it follows that the alternative hypothesis is
that H0 is not true.
As shown in Appendix A, Stata declares a calculated F-statistic of 59.11, which
must then be compared to the critical F-statistic. It follows that the critical value is 2.01
at the 5% level of significance, based on 7 numerator degrees of freedom and 2,583
denominator degrees of freedom. Since the calculated value is greater than the critical
value (59.11 > 2.01), the null hypothesis can be rejected. This conveys that the model as
a whole has explanatory power and that the R2 value is significant. Thus, having an R2 of
0.1381 means that 13.81% of variation in the dependent variable is explained by the
model.
Since the model as a whole has been shown to have explanatory power, it is
necessary to further investigate the significance of each independent variable separately
since multicollinearity and heteroskedasticity have been ruled out. In order to do so, the
p-value can be used as a basis for testing. The p-value for a t-score is the probability of
observing a t-score the size of the one actually observed or larger (in absolute value) if
the null hypothesis were true.
Since the p-value is being used to test the significance of each variable, the null
hypothesis (using a two-tailed test) is that the coefficient is equal to zero. If there is a
significant linear relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable,
however, the coefficient will not equal zero. Thus, the alternative hypothesis is that the
coefficient is different from zero.
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Typically, results are tested at the 1%, 5%, or 10% level of significance. Since a
significance level of 5% is usually the norm and is widely accepted in academic research,
this paper chooses to focus on this level. Although this is not as rigorous as the 1% level
(or even the 0.1% level), it still provides confidence in the results, especially relative to
the 10% level of significance. The 5% level of significance will be discussed primarily in
this paper, but the variables can also be examined at the 1% and 0.1% levels provided by
the tables illustrating regression outputs.
Using the 5% level of significance, the p-value less than 0.05 rule can be used to
determine the significance of the individual variables. That is, if the p-value is less than
0.05, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% level of significance, suggesting that
the variable is significant. As shown in Appendix A, The p-value for each independent
variable in the regression is less than 0.05 except for the variable Black. Thus, at the 5%
level of significance, it can be assumed that every variable except Black is significant
within the model. Although Black is insignificant based on its p-value, it should still be
included based on its theoretical importance.
Now that the model has been evaluated in terms of the regression equation as a
whole as well as individual variables, it can be determined that earning a higher degree
results in a 31.8% increase in logEarnings, ceteris paribus. This indicates that earning a
higher degree does result in higher earnings and a positive return on the investment.

5.2: The Chow Test
To apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, it is necessary to remove the
independent dummy variable HigherDegree from the equation and stratify the sample
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into two groups: those who have earned only a bachelor’s degree and those who have
earned higher degrees. Before this is done, however, it would be helpful to run a Chow
test to determine if the two sets of data contain significantly different regression
coefficients for the same theoretical equation. If the regression coefficients are indeed
significantly different, it follows that a structural difference exists between the two
groups. The null hypothesis of this test is that the regression/slope coefficients are the
same in the two subsamples. If this were the case, the coefficients would act no
differently for the two groups, implying that graduate school does not pay off at all. The
alternative hypothesis is that the coefficients do differ between the two groups.
The Chow test is an application of the F-test and requires three regressions to be
run. The first regression is the earnings function run for the entire sample without the
HigherDegree dummy variable. The next two regressions are identical in form, except
that the first includes only those individuals who have earned a bachelor’s degree while
the second consists of only those who have earned a higher degree. These regressions,
just like the original regression, should undergo basic analysis. This includes an
examination for multicollinearity, testing for heteroskedasticity, and testing the
significance of the equation as well as the significance of the independent variables. All
of the results for the regressions and tests discussed in this section can be found in
Appendix B.
The correlations between variables for the first regression (before the sample is
stratified) are the same as in the model using HigherDegree as a dummy variable. Again,
none of the correlations present a concern. Only Experience and ExperienceSquared
exhibit a high correlation, which is to be expected as discussed previously. Then, using
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Stata to determine the mean VIF, the result is 4.64. This again suggests that
multicollinearity is not a problem, especially in the face of high t-scores.
Testing for heteroskedasticity, the White test is again employed. The calculated
chi-square value using Stata is 35.66. For 22 degrees of freedom, the critical value is
33.924 at the 5% level of significance. In this scenario, the calculated value is greater
than the critical value (35.66 > 33.924), so the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is
rejected, suggesting the model is heteroskedastic. To correct for this, the robust
command in Stata is used.
Using an F-test to test the validity of the model and the significance of the R2
value, the calculated F-value of 49.45 must be compared to the critical value. With 6
numerator degrees of freedom and 2,584 denominator degrees of freedom, it follows that
the critical value is 2.10 at the 5% level of significance. Since the calculated value is
greater than the critical value (49.45 > 2.10), the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients
are equal to zero can be rejected. This, again, conveys that the R2 value is significant.
That is, the model explains 11.29% of variation in the dependent variable. In regards to
the independent variables, each displays the expected sign. Looking at the p-values, only
the p-value for Black is greater than 0.05. Hence, Black is once again the only variable
that is not significant at the 5% level of significance.
The next regression uses the same form, but is only run for those who have earned
a bachelor’s degree. Running a pairwise correlation in Stata reveals that only Experience
and ExperienceSquared display a very high correlation (0.9789). However, as before,
this is to be expected. Next, the mean VIF generated by Stata is 9.61, suggesting that
multicollinearity may be present within the model. However, based on theory,
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appropriate correlation coefficients, and generally high t-scores, this high mean VIF is
most likely the result of the high correlation between Experience and ExperienceSquared.
Using the White test to test for heteroskedasticity, the resulting calculated chisquare value is 19.79. The critical value at the 5% level of significance using 22 degrees
of freedom is once again 33.924. Since 19.79 < 33.924, the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity fails to be rejected, implying that heteroskedasticity is not present
within the model.
Following, the calculated F-value is 19.47. Still using 6 numerator degrees of
freedom, and 1,250 denominator degrees of freedom, the critical F-value is 2.10 at the
5% level of significance. Since 19.47 > 2.10, the null hypothesis that all slope
coefficients are equal to zero can be rejected. Thus, the significant R2 value conveys that
the model explains 8.55% of variation in the dependent variable.
Looking at the p-values for each independent variable, however, three variables
now exhibit a p-value that is greater than 0.05, suggesting they are insignificant at the 5%
level of significance. These variables are Age, Black, and ExperienceSquared.
Nonetheless, the remaining variables are significant at the 5% level. In terms of the signs
for each regression coefficient, only Age has a sign that is unexpected.
Finally, the same procedure is followed for the third regression, which is run for
only those individuals with higher degrees. Again, only Experience and
ExperienceSquared show a high correlation of 0.9464. Further, the mean VIF of 3.93
suggests that multicollinearity is not present within the model.
The White test, employed using Stata, yields a calculated chi-square value of
43.25. Again, with 22 degrees of freedom, the critical chi-square value at the 5% level of
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significance is 33.924. Since 43.25 > 33.925, the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is
rejected, indicating that the regression needs to be corrected for heteroskedasticity using
the robust command in Stata.
This regression can then be analyzed using the F-test. The calculated F-value
equates to 46.67. With 6 numerator degrees of freedom and 1,327 denominator degrees
of freedom, the critical F-value is 2.10 at the 5% level of significance. Since the
calculated value exceeds the critical value (51.54 > 2.10), the null hypothesis that all
slope coefficients are equal to zero can again be rejected. Thus, the significant R2 value
conveys that the model explains 18.90% of variation in the dependent variable.
Looking at the p-values for each independent variable, once again, only Black
shows a p-value that is greater than 0.05, suggesting that it is insignificant at the 5%
level. Thus, the rest of the independent variables are significant within the model run for
higher degrees. Black is also the only variable that possessed a sign that is opposite of
what was expected. Important regression statistics are listed in Table 5.2.1.
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Table 5.2.1. The Chow Test
(A Combined
Sample)
Age
0.0568***
(6.62)
Female
-0.142***
(-5.22)
Asian
0.186***
(5.38)
Black
-0.0105
(-0.23)
Experience
0.158***
(10.43)
ExperienceSquared
-0.0101***
(-7.28)
Constant
8.779***
(33.43)

(Bachelor’s
Degrees)
-0.00627
(-0.43)
-0.191***
(-4.80)
0.159**
(2.88)
-0.0230
(-0.38)
0.141***
(3.44)
-0.00459
(-1.55)
10.44***
(22.24)

(Higher
Degrees)
0.0461***
(3.89)
-0.176***
(-4.75)
0.130**
(2.94)
0.0416
(0.64)
0.234***
(9.87)
-0.0163***
(-5.74)
9.054***
(25.18)

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Now that these three regressions have been run, the Chow test can be executed.
The calculated F-statistic for the Chow test can be determined using the following
formula:
𝐹=

𝑅𝑆𝑆! − 𝑅𝑆𝑆! − 𝑅𝑆𝑆! /(𝐾 + 1)
(𝑅𝑆𝑆! + 𝑅𝑆𝑆! )/(𝑁! + 𝑁! − 2𝐾 − 2)

Where:
K = The Number of Independent Variables
N1 = The Number of Observations in Sample 1
N2 = The Number of Observations in Sample 2
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Thus, substitution yields:
𝐹=

𝑅𝑆𝑆! − 𝑅𝑆𝑆! − 𝑅𝑆𝑆! /(𝐾 + 1)
(𝑅𝑆𝑆! + 𝑅𝑆𝑆! )/(𝑁! + 𝑁! − 2𝐾 − 2)

𝐹=

1173.24175 − 535.150324 − 597.824148 /(6 + 1)
(535.150324 + 597.824148)/(1257 + 1334 − 2(6) − 2)

𝐹=

40.267278 /(7)
(1132.97447)/(2577)

𝐹=

5.75246829
= 13.0842408
0.43964861

Comparatively, the critical F-value can be found for (K +1) numerator degrees of
freedom (equal to 7) and (N1 + N2 – 2K – 2) denominator degrees of freedom (equal to
2,577). Hence, the critical F-value is 2.01. Since 13.08 > 2.01, the null hypothesis that
the slope coefficients in the two samples are the same can be rejected. This clarifies that
the regression coefficients do indeed act differently for the two groups. Thus, this
indicates that earning a higher degree does equate to higher earnings and that the model
should be stratified.
It follows that the coefficient values for the two subgroups are only relevant to the
particular group they define. Therefore, a comparison of the coefficients can be done,
allowing for an examination of how each variable affects earnings differently for the two
samples. Table 5.2.2 compares the regression coefficients for each degree type.
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Table 5.2.2: A Comparison of Regression Coefficients Based on the Chow Test
Variable
Age
Female
Asian
Black
Experience
ExperienceSquared
*

Bachelor’s Degree
-0.00627
-0.191***
0.159**
-0.0230
0.141***
-0.00459

Higher Degree
0.0461***
-0.176***
0.130**
0.0416
0.234***
-0.0163***

p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

From this comparison, it can be seen that the variable Age not only has different
coefficients for the two groups, but different signs as well. The variable is not significant
in the bachelor’s degree subsample, and displays a sign opposite of expected, suggesting
that a one-year increase in age results in 0.627% decrease in logEarnings, ceteris paribus.
For those with higher degrees, by contrast, an increase in age by one year should result in
a 4.61% increase in logEarnings, ceteris paribus. This likely captures characteristics of
the individual that are not captured elsewhere in the model. For example, the older an
individual is, the more likely it is that he or she will have greater experience gained from
other areas outside of the workforce (which is in turn accounted for by the Experience
variable). For instance, an individual may be able to gain experience doing volunteer
work, which a younger individual may not have.
The variable Female indicates a negative effect on earnings for both groups.
However, the regression results show that a higher penalty exists for those females who
hold bachelor’s degrees. That is, the coefficient implies that being female at the
bachelor’s degree level equates to a 19.1% decrease in logEarnings, ceteris paribus. This
can be compared to a 17.6% decrease in logEarnings for females with a higher degree,
ceteris paribus.
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As expected, the regression coefficients for Asian are positive for both subgroups,
suggesting that individuals who are Asian will earn more relative to other races. The
results indicate that Asian has a greater effect on earnings for the bachelor’s degree
subsample relative to the higher degree subsample. That is, an individual who is Asian
can expect a 15.9% increase in logEarnings, ceteris paribus, if they hold a bachelor’s
degree, but only a 13.0% increase in logEarnings, ceteris paribus, if they hold a higher
degree.
Contrary to Asian the variable Black is expected to be negative. This is only the
case for the subsample containing individuals with a bachelor’s degree. Further, the
results are not significant for either subgroup. Disregarding significance, however, the
results would signal that individuals who identified themselves as black would
experience a decrease in logEarnings by 2.3%, ceteris paribus, if they held a bachelor’s
degree. However, if they held a higher degree, they would actually experience an
increase in logEarnings by 4.16%, ceteris paribus.
Lastly, the variables representing experience must be analyzed. As discussed in
the model specification, a non-linear relationship exists between experience and earnings.
Thus, a quadratic was employed to represent the inverted U-function. This illustrates that
as experience increases, earnings increase at a decreasing rate, eventually reaching a
turning point where earnings actually decrease with greater experience.
For this reason, Experience and ExperienceSquared must be interpreted together.
Although the previous variables have been interpreted independently, it is not permissible
to follow that process in this scenario. This is because it is not possible for Experience to
change without also changing ExperienceSquared (and vice versa). Therefore, to assess
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the change in logEarnings associated with the change in the individual’s level of
experience, calculus must be used. Taking the partial derivative of earnings with respect
to experience (such that Y denotes logEarnings and Exp denotes Experience in this case),
it follows that:
𝑌 = 𝛽! + ⋯ +      𝛽!"# 𝐸𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽!"!! 𝐸𝑥𝑝!
𝜕𝑌
= 𝛽 !"# + 2𝛽!"#! 𝐸𝑥𝑝
𝜕𝐸𝑥𝑝
This equation, as a whole, therefore represents the expected change in logEarnings as
Experience changes, all else being equal. Thus, the marginal effects are not constant and
vary with each point on the curve.
Now, looking at the two subsamples, for those with bachelor’s degrees, the
regression coefficient for the variable Experience is positive, accompanied by a negative
coefficient for ExperienceSquared. This is as expected and suggests that the function is
increasing at a decreasing rate. More specifically, the regression coefficient for
Experience is 0.141 while the coefficient for ExperienceSquared is -0.00459 (although
insignificant). Thus, using the model above, the derivative of earnings with respect to
experience for bachelor’s degrees is:
𝜕𝑌
= 0.141 − 0.00918(𝐸𝑥𝑝)
𝜕𝐸𝑥𝑝
Hence, it follows that the change in logEarnings for those with bachelor’s degrees is:
𝛥𝑌 = 0.141 − 0.00918 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝)
This equation can then be used to estimate the marginal effects of a change in experience
at each point on the curve.
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The same method can be used to analyze the subgroup of individuals holding
higher degrees. Again, the regression coefficient for the variable Experience is positive
while the coefficient for the variable ExperienceSquared is negative, as anticipated.
Specifically, the regression coefficient for Experience is 0.234 and the coefficient for
ExperienceSquared is -0.0163. Therefore, for higher degrees, the derivative of earnings
with respect to experience is:
𝜕𝑌
= 0.234 − 0.0326(𝐸𝑥𝑝)
𝜕𝐸𝑥𝑝
It follows that the change in LogEarnings for higher degrees is thus:
𝛥𝑌 = 0.234 − 0.0326 𝐸𝑥𝑝 (𝛥𝐸𝑥𝑝)
Again, this equation can be used at each point along the curve to estimate the marginal
effects on earnings as experience changes.
Overall, the above comparisons illustrate how the models differ in terms of their
regression coefficients. Seeing that the two sets of data cannot be treated in the same
way due to different regression coefficients, it follows that the two subgroups are
structurally different. Therefore, it is reasonable to use the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition procedure to further investigate the difference in earnings between the
samples and determine how much of it is due to explained and unexplained factors.

5.3: An Application of the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Procedure
As a reminder, to examine the difference in earnings between those with
bachelor’s degrees and those with higher degrees, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
procedure can be applied using the following formula:
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𝑌!" −    𝑌! = (𝑌!" − 𝑌!∗ ) + (𝑌!∗ − 𝑌! )
(Blau et al., 2014)
Again, each component can be represented as follows:
𝑌!" = 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!"
𝑌! = 𝛽! ! + 𝛽! !   ×  𝑋!
𝑌!∗ = 𝛽! !" + 𝛽! !"   ×  𝑋!
(Blau et al., 2014)

Using the separate regressions employed for each subsample in the Chow test, the
calculations for each component of decomposition procedure are shown in Table 5.3.1,
5.3.2, and 5.3.3. As a note, all statistics used and discussed in this section can be found
in Appendix C

Table 5.3.1: 𝑌!"
𝒀𝑯𝑫
X Variable Name

𝛽!"

𝑋!"

𝛽!"   ×  𝑋!"

Antilog(𝑌!" )

Age

0.0461481

30.57132

1.410808332

---

Female

-0.1761489

0.4660194

-0.082088805

---

Asian

0.1302865

0.2337565

0.030455316

---

Black

0.0416191

0.0911128

0.003792033

---

Experience

0.23386

3.536221

0.826980643

---

18.28115

-0.297372155

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0162666
Constant (𝛽! !" )

---

---

9.054363

Total (𝑌!" )

---

---

10.9469384

$56,779.9395

121

Table 5.3.2: 𝑌!
𝒀𝑩
X Variable Name

𝛽!

𝑋!

𝛽!   ×  𝑋!

Antilog(𝑌! )

Age

-0.0062673

30.38571

-0.19043636

---

Female

-0.1913773

0.315873

-0.060450922

---

Asian

0.1593942

0.131746

0.020999548

---

Black

-0.0229668

0.1111111

-0.002551866

---

Experience

0.1413166

7.18254

1.015012132

---

56.6619

-0.26016878

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0045916
Constant (𝛽! ! )

---

---

10.44329

Total (𝑌! )

---

---

10.96569375

$57,854.91857

𝛽!"   ×  𝑋!

Antilog(𝑌!∗ )

Table 5.3.3: 𝑌!∗
𝒀∗𝑩
X Variable Name

𝛽!"

𝑋!

Age

0.0461481

30.38571

1.402242784

---

Female

-0.1761489

0.315873

-0.055640681

---

Asian

0.1302865

0.131746

0.017164725

---

Black

0.0416191

0.1111111

0.004624344

---

Experience

0.23386

7.18254

1.679708804

---

56.6619

-0.921696463

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0162666
Constant (𝛽! !" )

---

---

9.054363

Total (𝑌∗! )

---

---

11.18076651

$71,737.32861
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Using these calculations, the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition procedure yields:

Difference = Explained + Unexplained
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = (𝑌!" − 𝑌!∗ ) + (𝑌!∗ − 𝑌! )
−$1,074.979028 =    −$14,957.389 + $13,882.41

The results show that the explained portion is -$14,957.39 while the unexplained
portion is $13,882.41. These two values can now be interpreted to better understand the
difference in earnings between those with bachelor’s degrees and those with higher
degrees.
As a reminder, the explained portion is the difference in average skill level for the
two different degree types, evaluated using the higher degree regression coefficients.
More simply, this is the dollar amount of the earnings difference that can be attributed to
actual differences in ability. It was suspected that this number would be positive,
according to the premise that those with higher degrees should earn more. The negative
number produced, however, implies that those with bachelor’s degrees are actually
earning more. At first glance, this is surprising. Although herding suggested that earning
a higher degree might not provide as significant of a return relative to the investment
when compared to a bachelor’s degree, it is still expected to yield higher earnings on
average. However, it is important to address the age group that the model is analyzing.
Clearly, since earning a higher degree takes time, those who further their
education are delaying their entry into the labor force. This, again, is represented by the
human capital model, which suggests that individuals take on costs in the short run
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(explicit and implicit) to achieve a higher payoff in the long run. Therefore, those who
make the decision to pursue a higher degree (and thus enter the labor market later than
individuals who earn a bachelor’s degree) are sacrificing not only earnings but also
experience. As a result, the variable Experience is what is most likely causing those with
bachelor’s degrees to earn more. Since the model addresses individuals early on in their
career, this age group depicts those with higher degrees as doing worse because they have
just recently left school and lack the experience that those with bachelor’s degrees have.
Comparing the averages for the variable Experience, those with bachelor’s
degrees have a mean of 7.18 years of experience while those who hold higher degrees
have an average of 3.54 years of experience. Therefore, the negative difference in
earnings can most likely be attributed to the young age group used.
It is possible that the payoff on higher degrees will be realized later in life.
However, the results suggest that there may be no immediate payoff for graduate school.
With the rising cost of tuition, this signifies the importance of weighing the costs against
the benefits, especially in the face of large loans. If the cost of attending is much more
than the resulting increase in earnings, the investment may not be worth it. In fields with
less job opportunity, this is especially important to consider. Even if a higher salary is
guaranteed, the extra cost of education and accumulated debt might be a heavy burden
when the return on the investment is slow. Assessing how quickly an increase in
earnings will offset tuition loans and costs undertaken by delaying entry into the
workforce is an important measure to take.
Looking at the unexplained portion ($13,882.41), this value measures the
difference in the market value of skills for each degree type multiplied by the average

124

skill level of those with bachelor degrees. It is how much more those with bachelor’s
degrees would earn if they were rewarded in the same way as those who earn a higher
degree. In essence, it reflects the difference in monetary return or reward for skills.
Since the main determinant of this value is the difference in regression coefficients
between those who have earned a higher degree and those who have earned a bachelor’s
degree, the term should be small if earning a higher degree does not result in a huge
payoff.
This value must also be analyzed carefully considering the age group at hand.
Again, because the term uses the characteristics of those who have earned a bachelor’s
degree, this number is most likely large and positive because these individuals have more
experience. Thus, the term may be influenced heavily by the Experience variable once
again, resulting in the positive value. Thus, it may be that Experience is overriding most
of the human capital characteristics in regards to education.
Although the positive unexplained value is not inconsistent with the theory
because it is predicted that a higher degree should yield higher earnings, it is difficult to
assess whether the payoff of pursuing more education is large or small due to the
opposite signs of the explained and unexplained portions. The variable Experience
makes it difficult to isolate the effects of herding and analyze the return on the investment
to determine if earning a higher degree pays off. For this reason, it may be helpful to
extend the model further by attempting to control at least partially for experience.
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5.4: Controlling for Experience
Although it would still be beneficial to use recent graduates to isolate the effects
of the degree, the idea of a ‘recent graduate’ means different things for the varying degree
types. Assuming that most individuals choose to go to graduate school right after earning
their undergraduate degree, it is possible to adjust the age ranges for each group to better
reflect each category. Using ages 28 to 32 for those with bachelor’s degrees assumes that
these individuals are early on in their careers, but nonetheless still established. For those
with higher degrees, however, we can use the age range directly following this, 33 to 37
years. This assumes that these individuals have been given time to complete their degree
and are more on par with the experience level of those who hold bachelor’s degrees given
that they entered the labor force at later points in their lifetimes.
Once again, two regressions must be run separately before applying the OaxacaBlinder decomposition procedure. All results discussed in this section can be found in
Appendix D. Table 5.4.1 outlines regression coefficients and t-statistics.
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Table 5.4.1: Regressions Controlling for Experience
(Bachelor’s Degree)
Age
0.00515
(0.27)
Female
-0.194***
(-4.41)
Asian
0.130*
(2.12)
Black
-0.0302
(-0.46)
Experience
0.184***
(3.70)
ExperienceSquared
-0.00744
(-1.94)
Constant
9.969***
(16.81)

(Higher Degree)
0.0358*
(2.34)
-0.186***
(-4.45)
0.132**
(2.73)
-0.0439
(-0.63)
0.169***
(8.49)
-0.00829***
(-5.71)
9.423***
(17.54)

t statistics in parentheses
*
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

The first regression is run using the established earnings function including only
those defined as having an age of 28 to 32 years who hold a bachelor’s degree. Using
Stata to look at the correlations between variables, once again, it is no surprise that
Experience and ExperienceSquared are highly correlated (0.9776). No other variables
are correlated in an unexpected way. The mean VIF is 9.10, suggesting there may be
multicollinearity, but this is most likely attributed to the high correlation mentioned since
the t-scores are high and theory dictates that these variables are appropriate.
Testing for heteroskedasticity, the White test is once again employed. The
calculated chi-square value is 33.52. Using 22 degrees of freedom, the critical chi-square
value at the 5% level is 33.924. Since the calculated value is less than the critical value
(33.52 < 33.924), the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity fails to be rejected, suggesting
the model is not heteroskedastic.
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The regression can then be analyzed using the F-test. The calculated F-value is
equal to 16.80. Further, the regression contains 6 numerator degrees of freedom and
1,056 denominator degrees of freedom. This equates to a critical F-value of 2.10 at the
5% level of significance. Since 16.80 > 2.10, the null hypothesis that all regression
coefficients equal zero can be rejected. Therefore, the R2 value of .0871 indicates that the
model explains 8.71% of variation in the dependent variable.
Next, when evaluating each independent variable, each coefficient exhibits the
expected sign. Using p-values to consider the significance of each variable, Female,
Asian, and Experience all have a p-value less than 0.05, suggesting they are indeed
significant at the 5% level of significance. However, all other variables (Age, Black, and
ExperienceSquared) exhibit p-values greater than 0.05, indicating insignificance at the
5% level.
A second regression is then run with an identical earnings function, but this time
for the group defined by those who hold a higher degree in the age range of 33 to 37
years of age. Looking at pairwise correlations, Experience and ExperienceSquared
exhibit a high correlation of 0.9581. This is not unsuspected and is the only correlation
that is high enough to generate a second look. The mean VIF for this last regression is
4.86, implying that multicollinearity most likely does not exist within the model.
This model, as well, must be tested for heteroskedasticity using the White test.
Stata produces a calculated chi-square value of 18.69. The critical value, again for 22
degrees of freedom, is 33.924 at the 5% level. It follows that the null hypothesis of
homoscedasticity fails to be rejected at the 5% level since the critical value exceeds the
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calculated value (18.69 < 33.924). Therefore, it is not suspected that the regression is
heteroskedastic.
Using the F-test to test the explanatory model of the power, the calculated F-value
of 31.63 can be compared to the critical F-value of 2.10 based on 6 numerator degrees of
freedom and 1,166 denominator degrees of freedom at the 5% level of significance.
Following, the calculated value is greater than the critical value (31.63 > 2.10), verifying
a significant R2 term at the 5% level. The R2 value of .1400 means that the model
explains 14.00% of variation in the dependent variable.
In terms of the independent variables, all exhibit the expected sign. Regarding pvalues, only the variable Black has a p-value that is greater that 0.05, suggesting
insignificance at the 5% level. All other variables are significant at the 5% level,
boasting p-values less than 0.05.
Next, comparing the summary statistics of each regression, those in the bachelor’s
degree subsample average 6.81 years of experience compared to 6.58 years of experience
for those in the higher degree category. Thus, since the average experience for each
group is relatively equal, applying the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure in this
scenario may produce more helpful results. The calculations for each component of the
decomposition are shown in tables 5.4.2, 5.4.3, and 5.4.4.
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Table 5.4.2:  𝑌!"
𝒀𝑯𝑫
X Variable Name

𝛽!"

𝑋!"

𝛽!"   ×  𝑋!"

Antilog(𝑌!" )

Age

0.0358405

35.05952

1.256550727

---

Female

-0.1863469

0.3860544

-0.071940041

---

Asian

0.1317421

0.2406463

0.031703249

---

Black

-0.0438799

0.0960884

-0.004216349

---

Experience

0.1694012

6.582483

1.115080519

---

55.93112

-0.463590681

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0082886
Constant (𝛽! !" )

---

---

9.422825

Total (𝑌!" )

---

---

11.28641242

$79,730.89441

𝛽!   ×  𝑋!

Antilog(𝑌! )

Table 5.4.3: 𝑌!
𝒀𝑩
X Variable Name

𝛽!

𝑋!

Age

0.0051468

29.90704

0.153925553

---

Female

-0.1939622

0.313615

-0.060829455

---

Asian

0.1302177

0.1286385

0.01675101

---

Black

-0.0302162

0.1079812

-0.003262782

---

Experience

0.1838526

6.807512

1.251578781

---

50.29108

-0.374281305

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0074423
Constant (𝛽! ! )

---

---

9.968688

Total (𝑌! )

---

---

10.9525698

$57,100.59422
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Table 5.4.4: 𝑌!∗
𝒀∗𝑩
X Variable Name

𝑋!

𝛽!"

𝛽!"   ×  𝑋!

Antilog(𝑌!∗ )

Age

0.0358405

29.90704

1.071883267

---

Female

-0.1863469

0.313615

-0.058441183

---

Asian

0.1317421

0.1286385

0.016947106

---

Black

-0.0438799

0.1079812

-0.004738204

---

Experience

0.1694012

6.807512

1.153200702

---

50.29108

-0.416842646

-----

ExperienceSquared -0.0082886
Constant (𝛽! !" )

---

---

9.422825

Total (𝑌∗! )

---

---

11.18483404

$72,029.7165

Then, the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition procedure yields:

Difference = Explained + Unexplained
𝑌!" −    𝑌! = (𝑌!" − 𝑌!∗ ) + (𝑌!∗ − 𝑌! )
$22,630.30019 =   $7,701.1779 + $14,929.12229	
  

The explained portion ($7,701.18) represents the difference in earnings that can
be attributed to actual differences in skill. It was expected, based on the hypothesis, that
this portion would be larger than the unexplained term ($14,929.12), suggesting that
earnings are linked to more than just holding a higher degree. However, contrary to what
was presumed, the explained term is smaller than the unexplained term, suggesting that
there is a significant payoff associated with earning a higher degree.
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Looking at this using a percentage, the explained portion accounts for 34.03% of
the earnings difference. That is, about a third of the difference can be attributed to this
term. Similarly, based on the hypothesis, the explained percentage was expected to be
larger than the unexplained percentage since it was suspected that the difference in
earnings was linked to other factors that contribute to earnings as well. Since the
explained term is a smaller percentage, however, the results suggest a high return
connected to earning a higher degree.
Based on a pecuniary analysis, in terms of the human capital investment model, if
the costs associated with attending school are much higher than the payoff, the individual
should choose not to invest. Since the results, however, do show that earning a higher
degree offers a fairly significant return; this implies that for most individuals it may be
beneficial to invest in a higher degree.
Beyond the explained term, the unexplained portion of the earnings difference
must be assessed as well. Since the main determinant of this figure is the difference in
regression coefficients between those who have earned higher degrees and those who
have earned bachelor’s degrees, the unexplained term was expected to be small based on
the assumption that the regression coefficients would not be all that different between the
two groups. This was suspected based on the hypothesis that earning a higher degree
would not result in a huge increase in payoff, relative to a bachelor’s degree.
The results, again, do not support the hypothesis since $14,929.12 is larger than
$7,701.17. This demonstrates that the coefficients between the two regressions were
indeed fairly different, attributing to the differing returns. In percentage terms, the
unexplained portion accounts for 65.97% of the earnings difference. Once more, this
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suggests that earning a higher degree does result in a higher return, relative to a
bachelor’s degree.
Although the findings do not support the stated hypothesis, the results of the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition do, however, reinforce the results found in the
preliminary regression using HigherDegree as a dummy variable. This regression
indicated that earning a higher degree yields a significant return to earnings. Specifically,
earning a higher degree can be equated with a 31.8% increase in logEarnings, ceteris
paribus.

A Further Examination of the Results
Now that the findings have been presented, however, it may still be possible to
look at the investment in terms of herding. Although the results should be taken at face
value first, it may be possible to hypothesize why the findings appeared as they did.
While the investment appears to provide a significant return for the average investor, the
decision to invest might still be irrational for some if the costs are greater than the
benefits.
Since the explained term does account for about a third of the difference, a sizable
amount, it appears that other forms of human capital besides education do still play a role
in regards to earnings, even if the part they play is less than the magnitude exhibited by
earning a higher degree. Therefore, this may suggest that individuals should still
carefully analyze the investment decision on a personal basis. Even though the explained
term is less than the unexplained term, it nonetheless represents a significant portion of
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the difference. This suggests that the explained portion should not be readily dismissed,
despite the smaller value.
If the percentage were much smaller than 34.03%, it would be easier to come to
the conclusion that earning a higher degree pays off for mostly everyone. Further, even if
the investment is likely to pay off for most, the decision to obtain a higher degree may
still be irrational for some if the decision maker chooses her option based on ‘unreliable’
signals, such as herding, that result in a payoff that is less than what is expected and less
than the outcome of an alternative choice. In other words, although the payoff of a higher
degree is significant, other alternatives may still offer a more significant reward.
Even if the choice is irrational for only a minority of individuals, it is no less
important that they gather information on their own to make an informed decision
resulting in the best possible solution. This is especially the case if herding is becoming
more prevalent, based on increasing enrollment. Although the data used suggests a
higher payoff associated with a higher degree today, it is still possible that herding will
cause a decrease in returns in the future due to an increasing supply of highly educated
workers entering the labor force.
In regards to the unexplained portion, the results are not entirely inconsistent with
the hypothesis since it was expected that those with higher degrees would indeed earn
more. Although the results did indicate that these earnings were higher than anticipated,
it must again be remembered that this is a reflection of recent data. Thus, it is still
important to be wary of the consequences of herding in the coming years if this
phenomenon is indeed occurring.
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If tuition continues to rise, even if those with higher degrees do earn more, higher
earnings may not be enough for some individuals to make up for the increase in costs.
This is especially true if other alternatives are more attractive in the sense that they yield
higher returns. Despite results inconsistent with the hypothesis, it is still important that
individuals consider the investment based on private information, as a more informed
decision is likely to result in the best outcome.
Although the findings suggest that earning a higher degree does equate to higher
earnings, individuals should not take this as a given. Despite results that indicate that
most should profit from the higher return, this does not mean that everyone will
experience the same fate. Individuals should still consider the investment carefully in
terms of individual costs and benefits.

5.5: Conclusion
The empirical results do not support the hypothesis, suggesting that the payoff of
earning a higher degree is significant relative to a bachelor’s degree. Running a
regression with HigherDegree as a dummy variable, the results indicate that acquiring a
higher degree should result in a 31.8% increase in logEarnings, ceteris paribus. Then,
removing this dummy variable from the equation allowed for a Chow test to be run. This
was used to determine if the two subsamples (bachelor’s degrees versus higher degrees)
exhibited equivalent regression coefficients. The results indicated that the two subgroups
were indeed structurally different, indicating that it was reasonable to apply the OaxacaBlinder decomposition procedure.
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The results of the decomposition suggested that those with higher degrees were
actually earning less, based on a difference in earnings of -$1,074.98. The explained and
unexplained portions displayed opposite signs, with the former equal to -$14,975.39, and
the latter equal to $13,882.41. After careful consideration of the data at hand, it became
obvious that the difference in experience between the two groups was what likely led to
this outcome.
In order to then control for experience, two subsamples with varying age ranges
were created to establish two groups that displayed more similar characteristics. The
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure was then applied again, resulting in an earnings
difference between the two groups of $22,630.30, such that those with higher degrees
were now earning more. Inconsistent with the hypothesis, the explained portion of the
difference ($7,701.18) was smaller than the unexplained term ($14,929.12) and
accounted for 34.03% of the earnings difference. The unexplained term accounted for
65.97% of the earnings difference.
This does not provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that earning a higher
degree may not provide a payoff as great as initially expected. However, although most
individuals should receive a significant return if they obtain a higher degree, this does not
mean that the few who do not should be discounted. Individuals are engaging in
irrational decisions if it is the case that they could have been better off by choosing an
alternative. Specifically, an alternative that they could have realized had they acquired
information on their own instead of engaging in herding behavior. This alternative may
be as simple as choosing a different field of study. Even if this outcome is only
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representative of the minority, it is still important to address the phenomenon and its
implications.
In extension, the unexplained portion, despite being smaller than the explained
portion, accounted for about a third of the earnings difference. This was significant
enough to suggest that earning a higher degree was not the only component that
explained differences in earnings between those with bachelor’s degrees and those with
higher degrees. Thus, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition presented here still stresses the
importance of acquiring information autonomously. It is still important to base the
choice to invest in higher education on factors beyond simply the decisions of others, in
the present and past. Individuals must decipher the signals that they receive carefully
when making their investment decision.
Further, if herding is becoming more prevalent, this may suggest a different
outcome regarding the decomposition of earnings in the future. Since the decision to
acquire a higher degree is associated with explicit and implicit costs, not only must an
individual pay for tuition itself, but she must also consider the experience and earnings
she foregoes by delaying entry into the workforce. This is especially important to
consider if tuition rates continues to rise. The direct costs may contribute to a large
amount of debt accompanied by a slow return on the investment (as well as no actual
guarantee on earning a higher salary).
Especially during economic downturns, having an advanced degree may actually
be a liability, considering an individual may be too qualified and thus unaffordable within
the labor market. Nonetheless, for others, a higher degree may be required for work they
wish to pursue and result in a payoff that validates the investment. Clearly, each
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individual must evaluate the decision to pursue higher education carefully, based on
individual circumstances and goals.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure presented in this paper has thus
provided insight into the returns on earning a higher degree, suggesting that the
investment must be considered carefully in terms of the context of the individual at hand.
Especially in the future, if the payoff associated with a higher degree declines as a result
of herding behavior, it is not wise for decision makers to simply follow the choices made
by others before them. Instead, individuals should make their decision by assessing
alternatives and gaining a better understanding of the returns.
Nonetheless, the results of this analysis do show that earning a higher degree is
still associated with a significant return and higher earnings for the time being. It is
unclear whether this will remain the case, but in the meantime, it appears as if the
majority of individuals should benefit from pursuing a higher degree.
The model presented, however, is not without limitations. The next chapter
discusses future research that can be done to further explore the effects of herding and
provide a deeper analysis that complements the research provided and discussed in this
chapter.
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VI. Conclusion
The decision to pursue higher education is a choice faced by many individuals.
The human capital model suggests that individuals engage in the decision to invest in a
degree only if the benefits outweigh the costs. Nonetheless, this method is employed
using an ex ante procedure, requiring an individual to make predictions about expected
returns. Since acquiring information has costs as well, it is likely that many individuals
look to see what others have done before them. This behavior is known as herding,
which occurs when decision makers abandon their own private signals, and instead make
their choice based on the decisions of others who have gone through the process
previously.
Although pursuing higher education has resulted in a significant payoff in the
past, this does not necessarily imply that the payoff will be the same today. With an
increasing supply of educated workers entering the labor force, it is likely that individuals
will experience decreasing returns. That is, if many individuals hold the same
credentials, they are no longer able to signal that they are more talented than any of their
fellow herd members. They are essentially lost in the crowd, causing a decrease in
returns based on an increasing proportion of consensuals.
The implications of this are reflected in the fact that students make ex ante
decisions based on the human capital model. Therefore, based on herding, decision
makers may hold false expectations of the present value of earnings, exaggerating the
true outlook. In other words, the benefits actually realized might be less than the benefits
that are expected, suggesting that the decision should be evaluated entirely differently.
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This is not to argue that earning a degree does not result in higher earnings, but
rather, that the earnings may be less than initially anticipated. Although some individuals
will still gain from the investment, the decision may be irrational for others if they could
have been better off by choosing an alternative, whether this be entering the labor force
immediately, or simply choosing a different major.
Current literature has not yet examined the theory of herding when applied to the
decision to invest in higher education. Although previous literature has attempted to
understand the decision making process and the returns associated with earning a degree,
none have gone so far as to examine the role of other people’s decisions on the choice of
the individual at hand. The empirical work of this paper attempts to fill this gap by
examining the returns to earning a degree beyond the undergraduate level in the presence
of an increasing number of students choosing to enroll in higher education.
The herding theory suggests that as more students are currently earning
undergraduate degrees, many may feel as if they need to attend graduate school to set
themselves apart and distinguish themselves in the labor market. Graduate school,
however, is not immune to herding since those who choose to attend may still base their
decisions upon what they observe their peers doing, as well as those individuals who
made similar decisions in prior years.
The choice to pursue education beyond the bachelor’s level is also useful for
analysis because the decision might be more isolated from external pressures, thus
reducing possible herding forces. Those who are considering enrollment are most likely
less influenced by parental pressures and know more about their own preferences and
what they want to do in the future. Having already experienced some college, they may
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also be more familiar with the costs associated with earning a degree. Further, they may
hold more information that is necessary for making an informed decision, such as
information regarding financial and credit constraints that they face, for example. Having
already survived the four years it took to earn a bachelor’s degree, it is also likely that the
individual is aware of what goes into earning a degree, and is thus much more likely to
complete their education as opposed to dropping out.
Assuming that a bachelor’s degree has become a basic requirement for obtaining a
decent job, it was hypothesized that the returns to a bachelor’s degree were more
significant than the returns to a higher degree, relative to the investment. Even if
obtaining a higher degree does allow an individual to earn more overall, it may not be as
much as expected, or as much in previous years.
To decompose the difference in earnings between the degree types, the OaxacaBlinder decomposition procedure was used to compare the two subgroups. The
explained portion of the decomposition was hypothesized to be large since it reflected
actual differences in skill level. The unexplained portion, on the other hand, was
expected to be small since this term reflects the difference in the market value of skills
for each degree type, multiplied by the average skill level of those with a bachelor’s
degree. Since it was anticipated that the return on a higher degree would not be that
much greater than the payoff of a bachelor’s degree, the unexplained term was expected
to be smaller, as this would imply that the regression coefficients between the two groups
do not vary by much.
Applying the decomposition procedure to the data obtained from the National
Survey of College Graduates, the results indicated that those with bachelor’s degrees
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actually earned more than those with higher degrees. Nonetheless, careful examination
indicated that this was likely a reflection of the higher experience level held by those with
bachelor’s degrees. This can be attributed to the fact that they had been in the workforce
for a longer period of time. Then, an attempt to control for experience required using
different age ranges for the two subgroups. The decomposition procedure was then
applied a second time, controlling for the difference between the two subsamples. The
results did not support the hypothesis, however, exhibiting a smaller explained term
compared to a larger unexplained term. The explained portion accounted for 34.03% of
the difference while the unexplained portion accounted for 65.97%.
Despite the fact that the results do not provide evidence in favor of the hypothesis,
the explained portion was still high enough to insinuate that although the majority of
individuals will benefit from pursuing a higher degree, others must still evaluate the
investment decision carefully. Even if a significant return can be expected for most, this
return is not necessarily guaranteed for everyone if other factors do still play a role in the
earnings difference. In addition, although the payoff of earning a higher degree does
appear to be significant, this does not imply that other alternatives fail to provide a more
significant return, thus making the decision to invest in higher education irrational based
on a pecuniary analysis. Further, even though the findings did not support a theory of
herding behavior and decreasing returns, this does not insinuate that such behaviors will
not take place in the future.
The model used in the paper, however, is limited in that it attempted to isolate the
effects of the degree by considering the payoff in terms of recent graduates who just
entered the workforce. A more complete story could be told, however, if the analysis was

142

extended to later years in the individual’s life, so long as the effects of earning the degree
could still be isolated in some way.
Further, future analysis could extend upon the results of this paper by looking at
experience in a more controlled way. Although the proxy variable used in this model is
widely accepted as an appropriate means for accounting for experience, it is not fully
accurate, as some individuals may have chosen to take time off of their career and reenter
the labor force later in life. In addition, individuals may have more experience if they
gained skills through activities outside of the workforce, such as volunteering, for
example. This leads to the question of the quality of experience, as well. The model
used assumes that each year of experience for an individual is of the same quality.
However, different individuals no doubt acquire different levels and qualities of
experience over the time frame.
Another drawback of the model employed is that it only considers the pecuniary
benefits of the degree earned. Although this is consistent with the human capital model,
theory also suggests that individuals acquire degrees for non-pecuniary reasons as well.
For example, an individual may choose to earn a higher degree simply because they have
a love for knowledge and enjoy learning. Others may hold preferences for certain careers
that require a higher degree. For example, an individual who wants to be a veterinarian
has no choice but to continue with her education. Thus, incorporating preferences would
greatly add to the analysis presented.
The results of this paper would also benefit from a model that attempted to
understand what factors played a role in the decision of the individual, whether this be
innate preferences, parental pressures, signals gleaned from the market, or signals
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gleaned from observing how others tackled the same decision (i.e. herding signals). This
complementary approach could better assess why individuals made the decisions they
did, also accounting for preferences and non-pecuniary benefits.
In addition, although the model focused on STEM majors and career paths,
looking at other majors and distinguishing between them could improve the research.
This would allow for a more complete understanding of the rewards associated with
earning a higher degree, by stratifying the sample further. It may be the case that the
payoff of earning a higher degree is much different for majors not in STEM fields.
Lastly, a better means for accounting for herding behavior could also greatly add
to the research presented in this paper. One way of accounting for the effects of herding
is to compare the returns of a higher degree today to the returns realized in the past. That
is, the same survey from a few generations ago could have been employed using the same
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition procedure. If the returns were higher in the past, it is
likely that herding and an increase in the supply of educated workers has contributed to
this decrease in payoff.
Another way to account for herding is to create a ‘social interaction’ variable
when looking at an individual’s decision to pursue a higher degree. For example, a
variable could be introduced that accounts for the number of individuals who made the
decision to pursue a higher degree in the last few years. This could proxy for herding by
factoring in the decisions of others into the choice faced by the individual at hand.
Although the research presented in this paper provides a basic analysis of herding
and its effects on the return to higher education, an extension of such research would
greatly add to the understanding of such a phenomenon. Although, currently, pursuing
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higher education appears to result in a significant return for most individuals, the effects
of herding behavior may have not yet been seen. If the power of custom continues to
prevail, individuals may be forced to reevaluate the decision to invest in higher
education. Further, if individuals are finding themselves in situations in which they are
worse off than if they had chosen an alternative path, the choice to pursue a higher degree
may have been an irrational decision.
This does not mean that America’s education system is becoming worthless.
Rather, this theory suggests that individuals would benefit from gathering information on
their own rather than following the herd, hopefully resulting in a better outcome than if
the individual follows the signals of others. Although the investment appears to be
worthwhile for most, for others, it may still pay off to choose a different path.
This also does not imply that the country should stop focusing on education. The
positive externalities of education reach far and wide and are necessary for the
advancement and competitiveness of the nation. Instead, education may simply need
some reform. With an abundance of intelligent individuals, willing teachers, and creative
resources, it may just take a better way to put these components together to result in a
worthy payout for the individual making the choice. The more an individual is informed
about her options, the more likely she is to make a choice that is best for her, regardless
of what others are doing.
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VII. Appendices
Appendix A: The Basic Regression
Statistics of Variables used in the Data Set:
. describe Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
storage
display
value
variable name
type
format
label
variable label
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Earnings
long
%8.0g
logEarnings
float
%9.0g
HigherDegree
float
%9.0g
Age
byte
%8.0g
Female
float
%9.0g
Asian
float
%9.0g
Black
float
%9.0g
Experience
float
%9.0g
ExperienceSqu~d float
%9.0g
HRSWK
byte
%8.0g
. summarize Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Earnings |
2599
72696.31
68007.8
0
999996
logEarnings |
2591
10.95519
.7145836
4.174387
13.81551
HigherDegree |
2599
.5151982
.4998651
0
1
Age |
2599
30.48134
1.701881
28
33
Female |
2599
.3932282
.4885608
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Asian |
2599
.1843017
.3878046
0
1
Black |
2599
.100808
.3011323
0
1
Experience |
2599
5.303963
2.95969
0
15
Experience~d |
2599
36.88842
33.16927
0
225
HRSWK |
2599
55.90958
8.617654
48
96

Regression run with HigherDegree as a Dummy Variable:
. regress logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 182.613089
7 26.0875842
Residual | 1139.91776 2583
.44131543
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 1322.53085 2590
.51062967

Number of obs
F( 7, 2583)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

2591
59.11
0.0000
0.1381
0.1357
.66432

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------HigherDegree |
.318277
.036627
8.69
0.000
.2464557
.3900982
Age |
.0270612
.0091268
2.97
0.003
.0091647
.0449578
Female | -.1815939
.027195
-6.68
0.000
-.23492
-.1282677
Asian |
.1384522
.034564
4.01
0.000
.0706761
.2062282
Black | -.0009048
.0440587
-0.02
0.984
-.0872987
.0854892
Experience |
.189099
.0153748
12.30
0.000
.1589509
.2192471
ExperienceSquared | -.0093928
.0013713
-6.85
0.000
-.0120817
-.0067039
_cons |
9.356601
.2673217
35.00
0.000
8.832415
9.880788
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Pairwise Correction for Regression using HigherDegree as a Dummy Variable:
. pwcorr logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared
| logEar~s Higher~e
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
HigherDegree | -0.0136
1.0000
Age |
0.1754
0.0545
1.0000
Female | -0.1136
0.1536 -0.0240
1.0000
Asian |
0.0943
0.1315 -0.0137 -0.0129
1.0000
Black | -0.0222 -0.0332 -0.0144
0.0627 -0.1592
1.0000
Experience |
0.2583 -0.6158
0.3488 -0.0601 -0.0250
0.0015
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2150 -0.5784
0.4037 -0.0584 -0.0206 -0.0114
0.9546
| Experi~d
-------------+--------Experience~d |
1.0000

Mean VIF:
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience |
12.15
0.082313
Experience~d |
12.11
0.082570
HigherDegree |
1.97
0.508303
Age |
1.42
0.705995
Asian |
1.05
0.949170
Female |
1.04
0.964858
Black |
1.03
0.968627
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
4.40

Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(29)
Prob > chi2

=
=

40.24
0.0801

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
40.24
29
0.0801
Skewness |
9.20
7
0.2390
Kurtosis |
3.55
1
0.0596
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
52.98
37
0.0429
---------------------------------------------------
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Appendix B: The Chow Test
Statistics of Variables used in the Data Set:
. describe Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
storage
display
value
variable name
type
format
label
variable label
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Earnings
long
%8.0g
logEarnings
float
%9.0g
HigherDegree
float
%9.0g
Age
byte
%8.0g
Female
float
%9.0g
Asian
float
%9.0g
Black
float
%9.0g
Experience
float
%9.0g
ExperienceSqu~d float
%9.0g
HRSWK
byte
%8.0g
. summarize Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Earnings |
2599
72696.31
68007.8
0
999996
logEarnings |
2591
10.95519
.7145836
4.174387
13.81551
HigherDegree |
2599
.5151982
.4998651
0
1
Age |
2599
30.48134
1.701881
28
33
Female |
2599
.3932282
.4885608
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Asian |
2599
.1843017
.3878046
0
1
Black |
2599
.100808
.3011323
0
1
Experience |
2599
5.303963
2.95969
0
15
Experience~d |
2599
36.88842
33.16927
0
225
HRSWK |
2599
55.90958
8.617654
48
96

Regression Run without HigherDegree:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model |
149.2891
6 24.8815167
Residual | 1173.24175 2584 .454040923
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 1322.53085 2590
.51062967

Number of obs
F( 6, 2584)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

2591
54.80
0.0000
0.1129
0.1108
.67383

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0568379
.0085802
6.62
0.000
.0400132
.0736627
Female |
-.142055
.0271954
-5.22
0.000
-.1953821
-.088728
Asian |
.1863462
.0346102
5.38
0.000
.1184796
.2542128
Black | -.0104684
.0446755
-0.23
0.815
-.0980718
.0771349
Experience |
.1582335
.015173
10.43
0.000
.1284811
.187986
ExperienceSquared | -.0101078
.0013884
-7.28
0.000
-.0128303
-.0073854
_cons |
8.779452
.2626461
33.43
0.000
8.264434
9.29447
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

148

Pairwise Correlation for Regression without HigherDegree:
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.1754
1.0000
Female | -0.1136 -0.0240
1.0000
Asian |
0.0943 -0.0137 -0.0129
1.0000
Black | -0.0222 -0.0144
0.0627 -0.1592
1.0000
Experience |
0.2583
0.3488 -0.0601 -0.0250
0.0015
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2150
0.4037 -0.0584 -0.0206 -0.0114
0.9546
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
12.07
0.082869
Experience |
11.50
0.086954
Age |
1.22
0.821846
Black |
1.03
0.969232
Asian |
1.03
0.973935
Female |
1.01
0.992646
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
4.64

Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

35.66
0.0330

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
35.66
22
0.0330
Skewness |
7.65
6
0.2646
Kurtosis |
3.45
1
0.0633
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
46.77
29
0.0197
---------------------------------------------------

Correction for Heteroskedasticity:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared, robust
Linear regression

Number of obs
F( 6, 2584)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=

2591
49.45
0.0000
0.1129
.67383

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0568379
.0087026
6.53
0.000
.0397733
.0739026
Female |
-.142055
.0267398
-5.31
0.000
-.1944886
-.0896215
Asian |
.1863462
.0366986
5.08
0.000
.1143845
.2583079
Black | -.0104684
.0472949
-0.22
0.825
-.1032082
.0822714
Experience |
.1582335
.0167446
9.45
0.000
.1253993
.1910678
ExperienceSquared | -.0101078
.0015191
-6.65
0.000
-.0130865
-.0071291
_cons |
8.779452
.2681293
32.74
0.000
8.253682
9.305222
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees Only:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 50.0083153
6 8.33471922
Residual | 535.150324 1250 .428120259
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 585.158639 1256 .465890636

Number of obs
F( 6, 1250)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1257
19.47
0.0000
0.0855
0.0811
.65431

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age | -.0062673
.0146614
-0.43
0.669
-.035031
.0224964
Female | -.1913773
.0398765
-4.80
0.000
-.2696096
-.113145
Asian |
.1593942
.0553813
2.88
0.004
.0507437
.2680448
Black | -.0229668
.0597445
-0.38
0.701
-.1401774
.0942438
Experience |
.1413166
.0410553
3.44
0.001
.0607717
.2218616
ExperienceSquared | -.0045916
.0029661
-1.55
0.122
-.0104107
.0012275
_cons |
10.44329
.4696612
22.24
0.000
9.521876
11.3647
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary Statistics for those with a Bachelor’s Degree:
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==0
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1257
10.96521
.6825618
4.174387
13.81551
Age |
1260
30.38571
1.706071
28
33
Female |
1260
.315873
.4650472
0
1
Asian |
1260
.131746
.3383487
0
1
Black |
1260
.1111111
.3143945
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1260
7.18254
2.253233
1
15
Experience~d |
1260
56.6619
32.82875
1
225

Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees:
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.1244
1.0000
Female | -0.1243 -0.0235
1.0000
Asian |
0.0991 -0.0028 -0.0173
1.0000
Black | -0.0408
0.0104
0.0586 -0.1377
1.0000
Experience |
0.2428
0.6028
0.0321
0.0716 -0.0522
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2276
0.6497
0.0331
0.0736 -0.0588
0.9789
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
27.71
0.036086
Experience |
25.05
0.039923
Age |
1.83
0.545290
Black |
1.03
0.970171
Asian |
1.03
0.973797
Female |
1.01
0.991237
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
9.61
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Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

19.79
0.5962

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
19.79
22
0.5962
Skewness |
5.52
6
0.4792
Kurtosis |
2.51
1
0.1134
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
27.81
29
0.5278
---------------------------------------------------

Regression Run for Higher Degree Only:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 139.302945
6 23.2171574
Residual | 597.824148 1327 .450508024
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 737.127093 1333 .552983566

Number of obs
F( 6, 1327)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1334
51.54
0.0000
0.1890
0.1853
.6712

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0461481
.0118743
3.89
0.000
.0228537
.0694425
Female | -.1761489
.0371138
-4.75
0.000
-.2489569
-.1033408
Asian |
.1302865
.0443845
2.94
0.003
.0432151
.2173579
Black |
.0416191
.0650073
0.64
0.522
-.0859091
.1691474
Experience |
.23386
.0236828
9.87
0.000
.1874001
.2803199
ExperienceSquared | -.0162666
.0028327
-5.74
0.000
-.0218236
-.0107096
_cons |
9.054363
.359649
25.18
0.000
8.348821
9.759906
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary Statistics for those with a Higher Degree:
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==1
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1334
10.94575
.7436286
6.907755
13.81551
Age |
1339
30.57132
1.693639
28
33
Female |
1339
.4660194
.4990304
0
1
Asian |
1339
.2337565
.4233772
0
1
Black |
1339
.0911128
.2878769
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1339
3.536221
2.404373
0
11
Experience~d |
1339
18.28155
20.18659
0
121
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Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Higher Degrees:
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.2221
1.0000
Female | -0.1037 -0.0411
1.0000
Asian |
0.0958 -0.0353 -0.0455
1.0000
Black | -0.0057 -0.0363
0.0788 -0.1749
1.0000
Experience |
0.3773
0.3830
0.0544
0.0721
0.0028
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.3149
0.3938
0.0480
0.0720 -0.0039
0.9464
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
9.70
0.103104
Experience |
9.61
0.104041
Age |
1.20
0.834333
Asian |
1.05
0.956733
Black |
1.04
0.961772
Female |
1.02
0.984988
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
3.93

Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

43.25
0.0044

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
43.25
22
0.0044
Skewness |
14.13
6
0.0282
Kurtosis |
10.44
1
0.0012
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
67.82
29
0.0001
---------------------------------------------------

Correction for Heteroskedasticity:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1, robust
Linear regression

Number of obs
F( 6, 1327)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=

1334
46.67
0.0000
0.1890
.6712

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0461481
.0123605
3.73
0.000
.0218999
.0703962
Female | -.1761489
.0369727
-4.76
0.000
-.2486801
-.1036176
Asian |
.1302865
.0470437
2.77
0.006
.0379983
.2225748
Black |
.0416191
.0678912
0.61
0.540
-.0915667
.174805
Experience |
.23386
.0264994
8.83
0.000
.1818746
.2858453
ExperienceSquared | -.0162666
.0031128
-5.23
0.000
-.0223731
-.01016
_cons |
9.054363
.375019
24.14
0.000
8.318669
9.790058
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix C: The Initial Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Procedure
Statistics of Variables used in the Data Set:
. describe Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
storage
display
value
variable name
type
format
label
variable label
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Earnings
long
%8.0g
logEarnings
float
%9.0g
HigherDegree
float
%9.0g
Age
byte
%8.0g
Female
float
%9.0g
Asian
float
%9.0g
Black
float
%9.0g
Experience
float
%9.0g
ExperienceSqu~d float
%9.0g
HRSWK
byte
%8.0g
. summarize Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Earnings |
2599
72696.31
68007.8
0
999996
logEarnings |
2591
10.95519
.7145836
4.174387
13.81551
HigherDegree |
2599
.5151982
.4998651
0
1
Age |
2599
30.48134
1.701881
28
33
Female |
2599
.3932282
.4885608
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Asian |
2599
.1843017
.3878046
0
1
Black |
2599
.100808
.3011323
0
1
Experience |
2599
5.303963
2.95969
0
15
Experience~d |
2599
36.88842
33.16927
0
225
HRSWK |
2599
55.90958
8.617654
48
96

Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees Only:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 50.0083153
6 8.33471922
Residual | 535.150324 1250 .428120259
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 585.158639 1256 .465890636

Number of obs
F( 6, 1250)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1257
19.47
0.0000
0.0855
0.0811
.65431

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age | -.0062673
.0146614
-0.43
0.669
-.035031
.0224964
Female | -.1913773
.0398765
-4.80
0.000
-.2696096
-.113145
Asian |
.1593942
.0553813
2.88
0.004
.0507437
.2680448
Black | -.0229668
.0597445
-0.38
0.701
-.1401774
.0942438
Experience |
.1413166
.0410553
3.44
0.001
.0607717
.2218616
ExperienceSquared | -.0045916
.0029661
-1.55
0.122
-.0104107
.0012275
_cons |
10.44329
.4696612
22.24
0.000
9.521876
11.3647
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Summary Statistics for those with a Bachelor’s Degree:
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==0
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1257
10.96521
.6825618
4.174387
13.81551
Age |
1260
30.38571
1.706071
28
33
Female |
1260
.315873
.4650472
0
1
Asian |
1260
.131746
.3383487
0
1
Black |
1260
.1111111
.3143945
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1260
7.18254
2.253233
1
15
Experience~d |
1260
56.6619
32.82875
1
225

Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees:
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.1244
1.0000
Female | -0.1243 -0.0235
1.0000
Asian |
0.0991 -0.0028 -0.0173
1.0000
Black | -0.0408
0.0104
0.0586 -0.1377
1.0000
Experience |
0.2428
0.6028
0.0321
0.0716 -0.0522
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2276
0.6497
0.0331
0.0736 -0.0588
0.9789
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
27.71
0.036086
Experience |
25.05
0.039923
Age |
1.83
0.545290
Black |
1.03
0.970171
Asian |
1.03
0.973797
Female |
1.01
0.991237
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
9.61

Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

19.79
0.5962

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
19.79
22
0.5962
Skewness |
5.52
6
0.4792
Kurtosis |
2.51
1
0.1134
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
27.81
29
0.5278
---------------------------------------------------
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Regression Run for Higher Degree Only:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 139.302945
6 23.2171574
Residual | 597.824148 1327 .450508024
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 737.127093 1333 .552983566

Number of obs
F( 6, 1327)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1334
51.54
0.0000
0.1890
0.1853
.6712

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0461481
.0118743
3.89
0.000
.0228537
.0694425
Female | -.1761489
.0371138
-4.75
0.000
-.2489569
-.1033408
Asian |
.1302865
.0443845
2.94
0.003
.0432151
.2173579
Black |
.0416191
.0650073
0.64
0.522
-.0859091
.1691474
Experience |
.23386
.0236828
9.87
0.000
.1874001
.2803199
ExperienceSquared | -.0162666
.0028327
-5.74
0.000
-.0218236
-.0107096
_cons |
9.054363
.359649
25.18
0.000
8.348821
9.759906
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary Statistics for those with a Higher Degree:
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==1
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1334
10.94575
.7436286
6.907755
13.81551
Age |
1339
30.57132
1.693639
28
33
Female |
1339
.4660194
.4990304
0
1
Asian |
1339
.2337565
.4233772
0
1
Black |
1339
.0911128
.2878769
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1339
3.536221
2.404373
0
11
Experience~d |
1339
18.28155
20.18659
0
121

Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Higher Degrees:
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.2221
1.0000
Female | -0.1037 -0.0411
1.0000
Asian |
0.0958 -0.0353 -0.0455
1.0000
Black | -0.0057 -0.0363
0.0788 -0.1749
1.0000
Experience |
0.3773
0.3830
0.0544
0.0721
0.0028
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.3149
0.3938
0.0480
0.0720 -0.0039
0.9464
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
9.70
0.103104
Experience |
9.61
0.104041
Age |
1.20
0.834333
Asian |
1.05
0.956733
Black |
1.04
0.961772
Female |
1.02
0.984988
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
3.93
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Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

43.25
0.0044

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
43.25
22
0.0044
Skewness |
14.13
6
0.0282
Kurtosis |
10.44
1
0.0012
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
67.82
29
0.0001
---------------------------------------------------

Correction for Heteroskedasticity:
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1, robust
Linear regression

Number of obs
F( 6, 1327)
Prob > F
R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=

1334
46.67
0.0000
0.1890
.6712

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Robust
logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0461481
.0123605
3.73
0.000
.0218999
.0703962
Female | -.1761489
.0369727
-4.76
0.000
-.2486801
-.1036176
Asian |
.1302865
.0470437
2.77
0.006
.0379983
.2225748
Black |
.0416191
.0678912
0.61
0.540
-.0915667
.174805
Experience |
.23386
.0264994
8.83
0.000
.1818746
.2858453
ExperienceSquared | -.0162666
.0031128
-5.23
0.000
-.0223731
-.01016
_cons |
9.054363
.375019
24.14
0.000
8.318669
9.790058
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Appendix D: The Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition Procedure Controlling for
Experience
Statistics of Variables used in the Data Set:
. describe Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
storage
display
value
variable name
type
format
label
variable label
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Earnings
long
%8.0g
logEarnings
float
%9.0g
HigherDegree
float
%9.0g
Age
byte
%8.0g
Female
float
%9.0g
Asian
float
%9.0g
Black
float
%9.0g
Experience
float
%9.0g
ExperienceSqu~d float
%9.0g
HRSWK
byte
%8.0g
. summarize Earnings logEarnings HigherDegree Age Female Asian Black Experience
ExperienceSquared HRSWK
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Earnings |
4328
83631.72
78080.34
0
999996
logEarnings |
4316
11.08303
.7445572
3.78419
13.81551
HigherDegree |
4328
.5281885
.4992625
0
1
Age |
4328
32.50416
2.896326
28
37
Female |
4328
.370841
.4830858
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Asian |
4328
.1885397
.3911878
0
1
Black |
4328
.0975046
.296678
0
1
Experience |
4328
6.78073
3.888762
0
20
Experience~d |
4328
61.09727
58.54003
0
400
HRSWK |
4328
55.59219
8.279316
48
96

Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees (Age 28-32):
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0 & Age >27 & Age <33
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model |
43.844655
6
7.3074425
Residual |
459.36352 1056 .435003333
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 503.208175 1062 .473830673

Number of obs
F( 6, 1056)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1063
16.80
0.0000
0.0871
0.0819
.65955

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0051468
.0189362
0.27
0.786
-.03201
.0423036
Female | -.1939622
.0439331
-4.41
0.000
-.2801683
-.1077561
Asian |
.1302177
.0612894
2.12
0.034
.0099549
.2504806
Black | -.0302162
.0660595
-0.46
0.647
-.1598391
.0994066
Experience |
.1838526
.0496704
3.70
0.000
.0863886
.2813166
ExperienceSquared | -.0074423
.0038329
-1.94
0.052
-.0149632
.0000786
_cons |
9.968688
.5930599
16.81
0.000
8.804978
11.1324
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Summary Statistics for Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees (Age 28-32):
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==0 & Age >27 & Age <33
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1063
10.952
.6883536
4.174387
13.81551
Age |
1065
29.90704
1.400791
28
32
Female |
1065
.313615
.4641799
0
1
Asian |
1065
.1286385
.3349567
0
1
Black |
1065
.1079812
.3105025
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1065
6.807512
1.988108
1
15
Experience~d |
1065
50.29108
27.01284
1
225

Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Bachelor’s Degrees (Age 28-32):
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==0 & Age >27 & Age <33
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.1353
1.0000
Female | -0.1200 -0.0447
1.0000
Asian |
0.0796 -0.0246 -0.0179
1.0000
Black | -0.0362 -0.0072
0.0517 -0.1337
1.0000
Experience |
0.2477
0.5676
0.0522
0.0485 -0.0455
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2295
0.6167
0.0514
0.0421 -0.0570
0.9776
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
26.04
0.038396
Experience |
23.74
0.042116
Age |
1.71
0.583511
Black |
1.03
0.971961
Asian |
1.02
0.976420
Female |
1.02
0.983939
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
9.10

Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

33.52
0.0549

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
33.52
22
0.0549
Skewness |
5.35
6
0.4996
Kurtosis |
2.22
1
0.1359
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
41.10
29
0.0675
---------------------------------------------------
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Regression Run for Higher Degrees (Age 33-37):
. regress logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1 & Age >32 & Age <38
Source |
SS
df
MS
-------------+-----------------------------Model | 90.7705891
6 15.1284315
Residual | 557.633024 1166 .478244446
-------------+-----------------------------Total | 648.403613 1172 .553245404

Number of obs
F( 6, 1166)
Prob > F
R-squared
Adj R-squared
Root MSE

=
=
=
=
=
=

1173
31.63
0.0000
0.1400
0.1356
.69155

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
Coef.
Std. Err.
t
P>|t|
[95% Conf. Interval]
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------Age |
.0358405
.0153297
2.34
0.020
.0057636
.0659174
Female | -.1863469
.0419228
-4.45
0.000
-.2685995
-.1040944
Asian |
.1317421
.0482479
2.73
0.006
.0370797
.2264046
Black | -.0438799
.0698892
-0.63
0.530
-.1810026
.0932428
Experience |
.1694012
.0199466
8.49
0.000
.1302659
.2085365
ExperienceSquared | -.0082886
.0014512
-5.71
0.000
-.0111359
-.0054413
_cons |
9.422825
.5371054
17.54
0.000
8.369024
10.47663
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Summary Statistics for Regression Run for Higher Degrees (Age 33-37):
. summarize logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if
HigherDegree ==1 & Age >32 & Age <38
Variable |
Obs
Mean
Std. Dev.
Min
Max
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1173
11.28614
.7438047
3.78419
13.65681
Age |
1176
35.05952
1.417169
33
37
Female |
1176
.3860544
.4870504
0
1
Asian |
1176
.2406463
.4276578
0
1
Black |
1176
.0960884
.2948379
0
1
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------Experience |
1176
6.582483
3.551446
0
17
Experience~d |
1176
55.93112
49.47012
0
289

Pairwise Correlation for Regression Run for Higher Degrees (Age 33-37):
. pwcorr logEarnings Age Female Asian Black Experience ExperienceSquared if HigherDegree
==1 & Age >32 & Age <38
| logEar~s
Age
Female
Asian
Black Experi~e Experi~d
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------logEarnings |
1.0000
Age |
0.1428
1.0000
Female | -0.1280 -0.0765
1.0000
Asian |
0.0859
0.0030 -0.0868
1.0000
Black | -0.0486
0.0270
0.0793 -0.1835
1.0000
Experience |
0.3055
0.3239 -0.0066
0.0135 -0.0381
1.0000
Experience~d |
0.2538
0.3565 -0.0232
0.0268 -0.0385
0.9581
1.0000

Mean VIF:
. vif
Variable |
VIF
1/VIF
-------------+---------------------Experience~d |
12.60
0.079386
Experience |
12.28
0.081401
Age |
1.16
0.863119
Black |
1.04
0.958833
Asian |
1.04
0.959100
Female |
1.02
0.979431
-------------+---------------------Mean VIF |
4.86
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Test for Heteroskedasticity:
. imtest, white
White's test for Ho: homoskedasticity
against Ha: unrestricted heteroskedasticity
chi2(22)
Prob > chi2

=
=

18.69
0.6646

Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test
--------------------------------------------------Source |
chi2
df
p
---------------------+----------------------------Heteroskedasticity |
18.69
22
0.6646
Skewness |
4.79
6
0.5704
Kurtosis |
1.65
1
0.1989
---------------------+----------------------------Total |
25.13
29
0.6714
---------------------------------------------------
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